What We Do

This section discusses our work with those four agencies, as well as the specialist roles we perform, including the:

• Defence Force Ombudsman
• Overseas Students Ombudsman
• Law Enforcement Ombudsman
• inspection functions
• Public Interest Disclosure scheme
• international programme.

Department of Human Services

The Department of Human Services (DHS) delivers the Australian Government's Centrelink, Child Support and Medicare programmes and a number of smaller programmes.

We received 6,804 complaints about DHS programmes in 2013–14, about 5% less than the 7,192 complaints we received in 2012–13. Complaints about Centrelink accounted for 73% of the complaints about DHS, followed by Child Support with 21%. Most of the remaining DHS complaints were about Medicare and the Early Release of Superannuation Programme.

[Back to Top]

DHS—Centrelink

Centrelink delivers social security and family payments, plus a range of other payments and services to people in the Australian community, and some people overseas. On 1 July 2012 Centrelink was integrated into DHS and ceased to be a discrete Commonwealth agency. However, we have continued to separately record the complaints we received about DHS' Centrelink programme to allow us to compare complaint trends over the years.

Complaints about Centrelink (and its predecessor agencies) have always been a significant part of the workload of this office. We receive more complaints about Centrelink than any other Commonwealth programme or agency. However, we acknowledge the complexity of Centrelink's task and the sheer scale of its operations.

In 2012–13 Centrelink processed 2.8 million claims for payments and paid out $116.1 billion. Some mistakes and delays are inevitable in such a large enterprise. Nevertheless, the significance of Centrelink to the lives of many Australians means it is critical to minimise errors and their impact as far as possible.

Statistics

In 2013–14 we received 4,966 complaints about Centrelink, slightly fewer than the 5,093 Centrelink complaints in 2012–13, which was in turn markedly fewer than the 6,355 in 2011–12. The number of people making complaints to us about Centrelink dramatically fell from December 2012 when we introduced a recorded message on our telephone complaints line, advising people that we would be unlikely to be able to help them unless they had first tried to resolve their complaint with the DHS Feedback and Complaints service.

More than 5,500 of the calls that people made to us about a DHS agency ended at the point where the person was given the telephone number to call DHS Feedback and Complaints.

Overview of the function

Dealing with Centrelink complaints

Reducing the volume of complaints has allowed us to have a greater strategic focus on the complaints that we do receive. With every complaint, we consider the range of mechanisms available to the person to resolve their problem.

By matching our approach to the person's complaint and circumstances, and explaining to people their other options to address their complaint, we were able to finalise more than 89% of individual complaints without an investigation.

The following case study shows how we can resolve a complaint without investigating it.

Significant issues in the reporting period

Investigation into service delivery complaints about Centrelink

In May 2013 we commenced an investigation, using the Ombudsman's own-motion powers, into Centrelink's service delivery. The purpose of the investigation was to test what people were telling us in their complaints about Centrelink, and to examine how DHS was progressing with its five-year project to transform Centrelink's service delivery arrangements.

The investigation was conducted by our office with the cooperation and assistance of many officers within DHS, not least its Secretary. Central to the investigation was our consideration of the automated service delivery channels that DHS had already implemented to help its customers to conduct their business with Centrelink, such as Interactive Voice Response and messaging on telephone inquiry lines, online reporting, Smartphone apps, to name a few. We also considered the options available to Centrelink customers who are unwilling or unable to use those automated service delivery channels.

In April 2014 we published our final report on the Ombudsman's website www.ombudsman.gov.au. The report includes 40 case studies to illustrate the problems that some people had navigating their way through Centrelink's system to access the services and payments they were entitled to receive.

We made 12 recommendations in the report to improve Centrelink's service delivery. DHS' Secretary responded positively to our recommendations. The recommendations covered almost every area of Centrelink's operations: managing call volumes and waiting times; responding to customer letters, emails and online enquiries; improving computer generated letters; making online services more accessible; improving access to the DHS complaints service; making the timeframes for claim processing more transparent; addressing delays for internal reviews of decisions and more.

In June 2014 we settled on a framework for DHS to report to us every three months about the implementation of our recommendations. We will be monitoring for improvements and report further in our 2014–15 Annual Report.

Assisting vulnerable people to navigate the system

Below is a case study drawn from Centrelink complaints that we investigated in 2013–14. It demonstrates our office's specific focus on helping vulnerable people to resolve their complaints about Government agencies. There are more examples of these types of cases on our website.

Jasmine said Centrelink told her it needed documentary evidence from a court. Jasmine told us she had no knowledge of this trust, and no idea how to prove that she was no longer involved in something she knew nothing about.

We investigated and learned that Centrelink's records showed the trust had paid money to Jasmine five years ago. We suggested that Centrelink use its legislated power to obtain information about the trust from the trustee or the Australian Taxation Office. Centrelink made third-party enquiries, but also realised that, in 2010, one of its officers had reviewed the information about this trust and concluded it had been included in Jasmine's record by mistake. Centrelink decided that Jasmine no longer needed to get proof that she was not involved in the trust.

Compensation for Centrelink errors

If a person suffers financial loss as a result of a Centrelink error or oversight that is sufficiently serious to be considered defective administration, they may be able to be compensated for that loss. Claims under the Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (CDDA) scheme are made to the agency responsible for the error.

One section within DHS considers CDDA claims made against the Centrelink, Child Support and Medicare programmes. If DHS refuses the person's compensation claim, that person can complain to the Ombudsman if they do not agree with the decision.

The CDDA decisions we see are generally reasonable and clearly explained. We have made some suggestions to DHS to improve its compensation letter templates, to encourage the customer to discuss the decision with the person who made it before complaining to our office. We also suggested that DHS prominently acknowledge and apologise for any mistakes it has made, even if it concludes that these did not cause a loss for which it can pay compensation. DHS has been receptive to our suggestions.

In a minority of cases we are not convinced that DHS' CDDA decision is reasonable and we request that it be reconsidered. In the following case, DHS not only changed its decision, but agreed to reconsider the claim and changed its internal policy on the basis of these comments.

Interaction between child support and Family Tax Benefit

In last year's Annual Report we said we would continue to monitor complaints where Centrelink reduces a person's Family Tax Benefit (FTB) because the person failed to obtain an extension of their child support assessment before the child turned 18. This problem persisted in 2013–14. We discuss this further in the section about Child Support, along with some other issues arising in the interaction between a person's child support case and their FTB.

Restricted service arrangements for certain DHS customers

In last year's Annual Report we mentioned the arrangements DHS has in place to impose service restrictions on some customers, usually as a temporary measure, to manage unreasonable behaviour. We consider this is a sensible practice to protect staff and other customers from abuse or aggression. We also recognise it is sometimes necessary to limit contact with certain customers whose behaviour imposes an unacceptable burden on individual staff and the agency overall.

In December 2013 DHS briefed us about its initiative to develop customer management plans as an early response to escalating customer behaviour. We commend DHS on its efforts to proactively manage and, if possible, diffuse aggressive or unreasonable behaviour.

We have continued to receive complaints from a small number of Centrelink customers who are dissatisfied with their service restrictions. Overall, we remain satisfied that Centrelink deals with these cases appropriately, but we believe there are some aspects that can be improved. For example, we have noticed that reviews of service restrictions were not always conducted when due, or on the customer's request.

We have also seen some cases where the person's service restriction impeded their capacity to communicate with Centrelink when there was a problem with their payments. We will continue to engage with Centrelink about this challenging problem.

Administration of Income Management

In our 2012–13 Annual Report we discussed the issues we had seen in Centrelink's administration of Income Management (IM). IM enables Centrelink to manage at least 50% of a person's income support payments to ensure they meet their priority needs and those of their children. IM has applied in the Northern Territory since 2007, and is gradually being extended to other geographic areas and, in some cases, to particular groups of Centrelink customers, not limited to geographic area.

The following case study illustrates a situation in which IM appears to have hindered, rather than helped, a person meet his priority needs.

Commitments from 2012–13

Debt-recovery complaints

In last year's report we said we intended to focus on problems with Centrelink's automated process to raise debts for Family Tax Benefit (FTB) on the basis of data from 'trusted sources'. Our focus is in cases where the debt appears to be based on wrong or outdated information, but DHS nevertheless insists on taking recovery action, often by referral to a contracted external debt collection agency. During 2013–14 we provided DHS with case studies of several such complaints and made some progress in this area, with DHS agreeing that these debts should be recalled from the agent while the debt is investigated.

Data transfer problems between Centrelink and Child Support

We said we would monitor complaints for evidence of problems with the transfer of data between Centrelink and Child Support about changes in care. There were very few complaints of this type in 2013–14. We consider that this is likely to be due to the integrated care teams DHS introduced to administer care changes across both programmes.

Centrepay

In last year's report we mentioned our submission to DHS' independent review of the Centrepay scheme, which is a free bill-paying scheme for Centrelink customers. In December 2013 we attended DHS' briefing with a range of other government, legal and welfare stakeholders about its implementation of the outcomes of the review. We acknowledge that DHS is working to improve its administration of Centrepay and will continue to engage with Centrelink when we identify issues in complaints.

Major activities

Apart from the remedies that we have achieved by investigating individual Centrelink complaints, our major outcomes relevant to Centrelink include:

• regular interaction with senior DHS officers to discuss and address the underlying issues in Centrelink complaints, through quarterly face-to-face meetings, and a range of ad hoc meetings by telephone, in person and by video conference
• continued effective liaison arrangements with DHS to investigate Centrelink complaints, assisted by a meeting in December 2013 to share information about our processes and powers
• the ongoing success of our 'warm transfer' arrangements to refer certain complaints directly to DHS for quick resolution
• our strong ongoing relationship with the National Welfare Rights Network to share information of mutual interest about Centrelink and its customers
• November 2013: outreach to Indigenous communities in and around Kununurra, Western Australia
• April 2014: completion of our investigation into service delivery complaints about Centrelink
• May 2014: meetings with community legal centres in Hobart and Launceston to discuss the role and how we may be able to help with Centrelink problems
• May 2014: roundtable meetings with community groups in Adelaide and Brisbane to discuss their experience of Centrelink's service delivery
• June 2014: DHS completed its project to reinstate the telephone number of the DHS Feedback and Complaints service in all of Centrelink's letters (DHS undertook to do this progressively from June 2013).

[Back to Top]

DHS—Child Support

Child Support assesses and, in some cases, transfers child support payments between separated parents, or to other carers, of eligible children. Child Support also registers and collects court-ordered spousal and child-maintenance payments, and some overseas maintenance liabilities.

The Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate complaints about Child Support's administration of child support cases. The Ombudsman cannot investigate the actions of the parties to the cases.

Statistics

In 2013–14 we received 1,426 complaints about Child Support, a fall of 18% from 2012–13 when we received 1,736.

As with Centrelink, the number of people making complaints to us about Child Support has reduced significantly since December 2012 when we introduced a recorded message on our telephone complaints line, advising people that we would be unlikely to be able to help them unless they had first tried to resolve their complaint with the DHS Feedback and Complaints service.

We finalised 1,444 complaints about Child Support in 2013–14, investigating 18% of them.

We categorise Child Support complaints according to whether the complaint was made by the person entitled to receive child support (the payee) or the person liable to pay child support (the payer). Of the 1,444 Child Support complaints finalised in 2013–14, 28% were made by payees and 69% by payers.

The split between payer and payee complaints has remained fairly consistent since we started recording the 'role' of the complainant on 1 July 2011. The proportion of payer and payee complaints within the investigated group was much closer.

We finalised our investigation of 265 Child Support complaints in 2013–14. 115 of those were payee complaints and 149 were payer complaints (43% and 56% of the investigated complaints respectively).

Overview of the function

Dealing with Child Support complaints

As with Centrelink complaints, when deciding whether to investigate a complaint about Child Support, we consider the range of mechanisms available to the person to resolve their problem.

The Child Support complaints we tend to investigate are those where the complainant has no objection rights and where he or she has been unable to resolve what appears to be a legitimate concern with a Child Support complaints officer in the DHS Feedback and Complaint service.

Significant issues in the reporting period

Consistent with previous years, the majority of the complaints we receive are from people concerned about the way that Child Support is or is not collecting money from them or their former partner, and people who believe their assessment is too high or too low. Often these complaints do not indicate a significant problem with Child Support's administration of the scheme. However, we have identified some significant issues in the reporting period. We discuss some of them below.

Problems with Child Support's processes for collecting payments from payers

A payee can choose to collect their payments privately or ask Child Support to collect for them. In 2012–13 about 54% of payees were on a private-collect arrangement. Where Child Support collects, the payee is entitled to receive only the amounts that are obtained from the payer. If Child Support does not receive any payments, the payee will not receive anything.

Many of the complaints we receive from payees are about Child Support failing to collect money from the payer. Child Support has a range of legislative powers it can use to collect money including via the payer's employer, from bank accounts and social security payments. Some payees complain to us because they have provided Child Support with information about the payer's employment and banking arrangements, but this has not resulted in regular payments.

We investigated many of these cases because the payee is not well placed to find out what action Child Support has taken to follow up the leads they provided. In many cases we are able to assure the payee that Child Support has acted on their information. However, we sometimes find that there has been a delay or error, as in the case below:

Each year we receive complaints from payees whose former partner is self-employed, which can inhibit Child Support's ability to collect. We recognise that in such cases, if the payer is unwilling to comply voluntarily with their obligations, it can be difficult for Child Support to enforce them. However, we think the integrity of the Child Support scheme will be undermined if people can readily avoid their responsibilities.

In May 2014 we advised Child Support that we were concerned by an emerging complaint trend whereby, as illustrated below, it appeared that payers were able to deliberately evade Child Support's efforts to collect through fairly simple measures.

In May 2014 we started discussions with Child Support about the criteria it applies when deciding which cases to take to court. In our view the criteria should include the size of the debt and the likely cost of litigation, but should also take into account factors such as deterrence and the reputation of the scheme as a whole.

We have also asked Child Support to consider how it can use its information-gathering powers to require the payer to provide information about his or her finances, both to help collection and to make it clear that Child Support is serious about compliance. We will continue to engage with Child Support about this issue into 2014–15.

Overpayments of child support

Overpayments of child support occur when a payee has been paid child support to which they are not entitled, usually because Child Support has made a retrospective variation to a child support assessment. Child Support will generally treat the overpayment as a credit against the payer's future liability. This generally means the payee will not receive any more child support until their overpayment is paid off. Sometimes Child Support will refund the overpayment to the payer in advance of recovering it from the payee, who can negotiate to repay the overpayment by having an agreed amount withheld from any future payments. The case study below is one such example. However, we have not seen many cases where this option is used.

In addition to offsetting against or withholding from future child support, there is a range of legal powers available to Child Support to collect overpayments from payees: withholdings from Centrelink payments, intercepting tax refunds and garnishee notices. However, it currently lacks the administrative and technical support to effectively use those powers. Child Support has advised us that this deficiency will be remedied via a new computer system, currently scheduled for 2015.

In our 2012–13 Annual Report we mentioned we had raised with Child Support a range of concerns about its administration of overpayments. We have continued our discussions with senior staff in DHS, and have been assured that many of the problems we identified will also be addressed in DHS' project to replace the Child Support computer system.

Child Support has also agreed to consider our suggestion that it improve the information it provides to payers and payees to explain the reasons an overpayment occurred and the options available to recover it. It also agreed to consider how it can provide better information to explain to payees how the overpayment was calculated.

The interaction of child support and Family Tax Benefit

There are close linkages between the Child Support scheme and FTB.

Maintenance action test

A person applying for FTB for a child, and who is not living with that child's other parent, is also expected to apply for a child support assessment. If they fail to apply for child support they will be paid only the base rate of FTB Part A, unless Centrelink grants them a maintenance exemption. Maintenance exemptions are rare.

In last year's Annual Report we mentioned we had investigated several complaints from payees whose FTB Part A had reduced to the base rate when their child turned 18, because they no longer had a child support assessment. Although they could have asked Child Support to extend the assessment until the end of the school year, they had missed their opportunity to do so before the child turned 18. DHS told us it was hoping to find a solution to this problem in consultation with its policy department, the Department of Social Services.

In 2014–15 we saw further examples of this problem. Typically, the loss of FTB is several hundred dollars each fortnight. By contrast, the extra child support the payee would have been entitled to receive is often negligible. We were pleased to learn in June 2014 that Child Support had recently revised the standard letter it sends to payees, inviting them to extend their child support assessment to warn them that their FTB might be affected if they fail to do so. However, we remain concerned by the harsh consequences for a payee and their child if they fail to apply for an extension. We will continue our investigation into this problem into 2014–15.

Maintenance income test

FTB Part A is paid subject to a maintenance income test. Any child support the payee receives over the threshold will affect their FTB rate.

For payees who have asked Child Support to collect payments for them, Centrelink works out their FTB based on the information that Child Support reports about the actual amounts collected and paid to them. However, payees who have chosen to collect their payments privately are deemed to have received the full amount of their child support entitlement, whether they did or not. This deeming arrangement is also applied in respect of any retrospective changes to the payee's child support assessment, even if they are unable to collect the extra money from the payer.

As the following case study shows, deeming the payee to have collected all of their child support can lead to unfair and anomalous outcomes.

In our view, it does not seem fair for Centrelink to treat a payee as having collected money they were not aware they were entitled to receive from someone they are now unlikely to be able to collect it from. We have written to the Department of Social Services to convey our concerns about complaints like Judith's. We will continue to investigate this issue in 2014–15.

Commitments from 2012–13

Overseas cases

In last year's report we said we were exploring whether there was a remedy available for a specific complaint about Child Support's administration of an overseas case. The payer, who lived overseas, was left with a very large Australian child support debt due to Child Support's failure to communicate with him over many years. This occurred even though the payer had paid the full amount ordered by the court in the country where he resided.

We suggested that Child Support approach the Department of Finance to explore whether it would be appropriate to use one or more of the Commonwealth's discretionary compensation and debt-waiver mechanisms to provide a remedy for the payer and payee in that complaint. So far, these mechanisms have been declined and we are assessing what options, if any, remain.

Compensation for missed child support

Also in last year's report we said we intended to work in consultation with Child Support and the Department of Finance to overcome what we see as an unacceptable gap in Child Support's capacity to remedy failures to take advantage of a collection opportunity.

We communicated several times with the Department of Finance in 2013–14 about this issue. We raised it with the DHS compensation team in late June 2004 and will continue to engage with them in an effort to find a suitable remedy for people affected by these (admittedly rare) errors.

Major activities

In addition to the major outcomes reported in the section on Centrelink, our major outcomes relevant to Child Support include:

• our continued membership of the Child Support National Stakeholder Engagement Group, convened by the Department of Human Services, which gives us the opportunity to meet with a variety of legal, community and government stakeholders in the Child Support scheme
• regular attendance of Child Support state stakeholder engagement meetings in NSW, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia
• May 2014: meetings with community legal centres in Hobart and Launceston and Legal Aid Tasmania to discuss our role in relationship to Child Support
• June 2014: Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs' Inquiry into the Child Support Programme.

[Back to Top]

Postal Industry

Overview

The Commonwealth Ombudsman is also the Postal Industry Ombudsman (PIO). The PIO role was established in 2006 to provide an industry ombudsman service for postal operators and their customers.

Australia Post is a mandatory member of the scheme, while private postal operators (PPOs) can register voluntarily. At 30 June 2014, there were five PPOs on the register.

The PIO can investigate complaints about postal or similar services provided by Australia Post and PPOs. The Commonwealth Ombudsman can also investigate complaints about administrative actions and decisions taken by Australia Post.

The PIO carries out its functions by investigating individual complaints, identifying and pursuing systemic problems, and acting on emerging issues.

Statistics

We received 4,053 complaints about Australia Post, which was an 11% increase on the previous financial year. Australia Post represented 23% of the total approaches that our office received this year. The majority of complaints involved Australia Post's nonreserved services such as parcel services, retail, banking and bill payment.

In 2013–14 we received 10 complaints about the other postal operators in PIO jurisdiction, which was five fewer than in the previous financial year. These and Australia Post's 3,829 PIO complaints totalled 3,839 complaints in PIO jurisdiction, a 15.8% increase on the previous financial year.

Investigated and not investigated

We did not investigate any complaints about PPOs. Of the approaches we received about Australia Post, we completed 294 investigations under the PIO jurisdiction and 27 under the Commonwealth Ombudsman jurisdiction. The main reasons for not investigating a complaint were:

• the complaint was outside our jurisdiction; for example, about employment or a company that was not a PPO
• the complainant could not show us that they had made a reasonable attempt to resolve the issue with Australia Post or the PPO
• we considered that Australia Post should consider providing a better outcome and transferred the complaint (a second-chance transfer)
• Australia Post or the PPO had provided a reasonable remedy or the remedy in keeping with its terms and conditions
• a better practical outcome was unlikely.

Second-chance transfers

Of the complaints we did not investigate, we transferred 1,079 back to Australia Post for reconsideration.

These were generally straightforward complaints where there was a delay in response, or where Australia Post could have provided a better explanation or outcome. If complainants were dissatisfied with Australia Post's response, they were able to return to our office and we would assess the response and decide whether an investigation was warranted.

We recorded a small number of complaints (38) as returning to our office because the complainant was dissatisfied with Australia Post's response to the transfer. We investigated only a small proportion of these, where it appeared Australia Post had not addressed the complaint. Usually we were satisfied with Australia Post's response to a transfer and declined to investigate.

Issues

The three top-level issues recorded for all approaches and complaints were single-event mail issues, recurrent mail problems and customer contact centre issues, as in the previous year. However, their prevalence as a proportion of all issues changed: single-event mail issues increased by 12% to 49%, and there was a decrease in recurrent mail problems (by 2% to 27%) and in customer contact centre issues (by 6% to 15%).

While some of this change may be due to variations in the way our officers record issues, we believe that the improvements are partly due to Australia Post's investment in staff training, improved internal communication and better complaint analysis in the past year. Other issues recorded were tender/contracts, employment-related and FOI-related.

The three top-level issues recorded for investigated complaints were single-event mail issues, customer contact centre issues and recurrent mail problems.

Remedies

Remedies included apologies, compensation payments, postage refunds, expedited action, staff being counselled or disciplined, and better explanations by Australia Post or our office.

Challenges facing Australia Post

Australia Post is a government business enterprise and operates under legislation (Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989) that establishes three types of obligations: commercial, community and general government.

It has the exclusive right to operate the letter-delivery service, but its other services operate in competition with other providers. Australia Post does not receive funding from government and is expected to operate in a manner consistent with sound commercial practice.

The growth in electronic communication and changes in consumer behaviour are affecting postal services around the world. The sharp decline in demand for letter services, combined with the costs of meeting the prescribed performance standards and a growing delivery network, are factors which have presented Australia Post with significant challenges.

A study by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), commissioned by the Department of Communications and the Department of Finance and released by the Government on 24 June 2014, indicates that the profits earned by Australia Post from its parcel business are not sufficient to continue to offset its losses in the regulated letters business.

The BCG study forecasts that escalating letter losses could overwhelm parcel profits as early as the 2014–15 financial year.

We are participating in an interdepartmental committee chaired by the Department of Communications on the modernisation of Australia Post. Our broad complaint-handling experience across the public sector gives us a unique insight into public administration.

We hope to use that perspective to ensure that the necessary reform process takes into account the potential impact on Australia Post's customers, the possible increase in complaints and the flow-on effects on the communication between government agencies and their clients, particularly the vulnerable and disadvantaged members of the community.

StarTrack

Australia Post has fully owned parcel delivery company StarTrack since November 2012. In July 2013 Australia Post opted to include StarTrack in its PIO membership. In 2013–14, we recorded 47 complaints involving StarTrack, of which we investigated five.

A common complaint was the apparent misunderstanding by staff in both companies as to which one had responsibility for resolving the complaint. We appreciate that Australia Post is aware of the risk of confusion between the two companies, and that it developed new complaint-handling arrangements to address the problem. We are monitoring the complaint-handling relationship between the two and will provide feedback to Australia Post on the effectiveness of the arrangements.

The number of complaints we receive about PPOs has been declining in recent years. This may reflect a general complaint trend within the companies, or less awareness of the role of the PIO in the complaints process.

Past issues

In our last Annual Report we observed that information provided by Australia Post should help customers understand their rights and responsibilities, and to understand which service is best suited to their needs. We identified some information that could be improved (see below), and Australia Post undertook to consider changes for the revised terms and conditions and postal guides that were due to be completed in October 2013.

• 'Deliver as addressed' policy—Australia Post's policy is that mail for an address should be delivered to that address unless there is a redirection in place, with some exceptions. For example, residents who do not receive a street-delivery service can have their mail held for collection at the counter (free) or delivered to their PO Box (reduced rate, no mail-redirection fee). In some cases staff have told residents that they had to pay for a PO Box and a redirection or their mail would be (and was) returned to sender. Australia Post clarified the arrangements and worked with staff to resolve the problems. It also advised that the policy would be formalised to support the existing operational guidelines, which is in progress. Australia Post replaced the General post guide (September 2007) with information in other guides, and included clearer information on its website.
• Adequate packaging—Packaging is a significant factor when deciding whether or not to pay compensation for damage. Australia Post has improved this information. Its revised terms and conditions include an appendix on items that are prohibited unless packaged and presented as described, and its website provides information on how to pack different types of items. Australia Post has not yet revised its Dangerous & prohibited goods & packaging post guide (September 2009).

• Compensation—In our last report we noted there was potential conflict in information about the compensation payable for coins lost or damaged in the post. The terms and conditions allow for coins to be sent only by domestic Registered Post and only up to a certain amount, and provide for limited compensation. This is not clear in Australia Post's post guides, which in general are silent on compensation for coins or say that Australia Post accepts no liability for coins. Australia Post undertook to clarify its information, but has not yet corrected information about coins in the Dangerous & prohibited goods & packaging post guide (September 2009).

Inquiry into Australia Post

We made a submission to the Senate inquiry on Australia Post's performance, importance and role in communities, and its operations in relation to licensed post offices (LPOs). We await the committee's report which is due for release on 27 August 2014.

Our submission was based primarily on our experience in dealing with complaints about LPOs. We suggested that the LPO experience might improve for customers if Australia Post were to improve at least two areas:

• making clear the role and arrangements of Australia Post and postal outlets for complaint management
• having more consistency between policy and practice in operations and complaint management.

Liaison with Australia Post

Australia Post gave a tour of some of its processing centres to our investigations teams in Sydney, Canberra and Brisbane. We appreciated the chance to talk with some of the staff and to witness the operations first-hand. The experience was invaluable in helping our investigators better understand the complexities in postal operations, and we thank Australia Post for the opportunity.

We welcomed our tripartite meeting with Australia Post and the Department of Communications to discuss high-level issues. We also liaised regularly with Australia Post at the corporate and operational levels to discuss and resolve policy and procedural issues arising from complaints and other sources.

Australia Post provided briefings on issues of interest such as developments in the LPO network and critical events, and sought our comment on its proposed policy on community polls for street delivery services. Issues we covered this year included:

• complaint root causes and systemic solutions. We discussed with Australia Post how it analyses complaint findings to identify and treat the root causes of complaints and improve its systems. Australia Post advised us that in general, the complaints we investigate undergo root-cause analysis. It also said the complaints we transfer directly (second-chance transfers) have been useful in highlighting areas for improvement in the complaints-handling teams, most notably the need to provide better explanations of delivery processes, investigations and compensation decisions.

• tracking service and information. We sometimes receive complaints that Australia Post has misrepresented its tracking service. A common complaint is that parcels were not fully tracked, and therefore complainants are unable to check and confirm lodgement, progress and delivery of an item. While Australia Post aims to scan parcels at key points in the delivery process, we recognise this may not always occur, usually due to infrastructure limitations or human error. Since April 2013 Australia Post's domestic parcels suite has included tracking, and the tracking service has been supported with better infrastructure. In 2013–14 we noticed an improvement in the frequency of scans and have been able to use tracking records to achieve better compensation outcomes.
  
  We discussed with Australia Post the importance of providing clear public information about the tracking service and what it offers. Australia Post undertook to ensure that its public information reflects the nature of tracking. Its website has a dedicated page on tracking, to which product pages are linked, and the information clarifies the types and number of scans that may occur in different services.
• authorisation, signatures and identification. Australia Post's identification checks and verification of authority were a common part of complaints about unauthorised mail redirections, parcels being released to the wrong person and authorisation to leave signature items at an address. We approached Australia Post with our concerns about its policy and procedures, and hope to resolve our concerns early in the next financial year.

A number of our investigations on these and other issues resulted in improvements to Australia Post's policies, procedures or communications, and many achieved better outcomes for complainants. Some of these complaints and outcomes are outlined below.

Complaints and outcomes

Loss, damage or delay of postal items

Many of the complaints we received involved the loss, damage or delay of a postal item. In some cases we investigated and achieved a better outcome. Outcomes included some or more compensation; a refund of postage or other fees; a better search for lost items; a better understanding of what had happened; and action by Australia Post to address the deficiencies in the postal service and complaint handling.

Failure of mail redirections or holds

We continued to receive complaints about the failure of mail redirections and holds. Where we investigated, the main outcomes that we achieved were a refund of the service fee for the period of failure; and getting Australia Post to identify and address the cause of failure.

Accessibility for addressees with disabilities

We received some complaints from Australia Post customers with a disability. We investigated some of these and as a result Australia Post's delivery to the customer improved.

Other postal services

Retail services

Fees and statistics

The PIO can charge a fee for each investigation. Fees are calculated and applied retrospectively after the end of the financial year. The fees invoiced in 2012–13 for the previous financial year were $389,883 for Australia Post and $968 for FedEx, totalling $390,851. The fees are returned to Consolidated Revenue.

[Back to Top]

Australian Taxation Office

Overview

The Commonwealth Ombudsman is also the Taxation Ombudsman. The Taxation Ombudsman role was created in 1995 to increase the focus on the investigation of complaints about the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).

Our analysis of ATO complaint issues and outcomes in the context of all other agencies enables us to form an objective and comprehensive view about the ATO's administration.

A notable feature of the Taxation Ombudsman role is our ability to investigate cross-agency complaints. In some cases, taxation is but one concern for the complainant (for example, complaints involving the ATO and Child Support).

Our broad oversight of Australian Government agencies provides a unique opportunity to help complainants to resolve multiple concerns simultaneously and to help agencies improve their service delivery to shared clients.

The Taxation Ombudsman appears with the Commissioner of Taxation at biannual hearings of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue. The Ombudsman provides an overview of the ATO's performance based on complaints received and our liaison activities with the ATO. A copy of the latest submission by the Ombudsman to the Tax and Revenue Committee is available on our website.

During the year the Ombudsman was invited to speak at the ATAX 11th International Tax Administration Conference. The speech explored the Ombudsman's perspective on Australian tax administration, particularly the opportunities for the ATO to improve its communication with taxpayers to increase the public's trust in tax administration.

In its 2014–15 Budget the Government announced that the Ombudsman's tax complaint-handling function would be transferred to the Inspector-General of Taxation. The Ombudsman will continue to deal with tax complaints until necessary legislation is passed to give effect to the Government's decision.

Complaints about the ATO

In 2013–14 we received 1,369 complaints about the ATO, which represents a decrease of almost 24% on complaints received in 2012–13. Overall, complaints about the ATO accounted for almost 8% of the total number of in-jurisdiction complaints received by the Ombudsman during the year.

Complaints to the Ombudsman about the ATO are made mainly by individual taxpayers and small-business owners.

Cross-agency complaints

The ATO regularly interacts with other Government agencies including the Department of Human Services (Medicare, Child Support and Centrelink programmes), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Tax Practitioners Board. Complaints about the ATO may involve one or more of these agencies.

Child support payees regularly complain that the ATO has failed to take adequate action to ensure tax return lodgement by their former partner. A payer's failure to lodge a tax return may affect the amount of child support a payee receives.

Payees often feel that the ATO has not done enough, or has not informed them adequately about what actions it took, following their report to the ATO's Tax Evasion Referral Centre. Payees also often complain about the actions of Child Support in pursuing the matter with the payer and say that they are caught between the ATO and Child Support and feel powerless to resolve the matter.

Another, less common cross-agency complaint received by the Ombudsman relates to the Family Tax Benefit (FTB). Where the FTB is paid fortnightly, rather than annually, payments are calculated according to the family's estimated taxable income for the financial year.

In general, when a person lodges their tax return, Centrelink compares that person's income estimate with the ATO's assessment and, taking into account the FTB already paid, either tops-up the payment or raises a debt for overpayment. If the person (or their partner) fails to lodge a tax return within the prescribed time, Centrelink raises a debt for the full amount of the FTB paid for that financial year.

We have received complaints from FTB recipients who have been asked to repay the FTB because, although they had met their own tax obligations, their partner or former partner had not. Complainants typically claim that the ATO and Centrelink did not take adequate action to pursue the matter with their partner or former partner.

Past Ombudsman investigations concerning the ATO's actions in response to calls to the Tax Evasion line revealed that the ATO generally took appropriate action, even though the outcome may not have been obvious to the caller.

We recognise that privacy and secrecy provisions limit what the ATO can disclose about the tax affairs of another person and we therefore accept that the ATO is sometimes unable to provide specific details of the outcome of its investigation or actions. However, we have provided feedback to the ATO regarding its handling of cross-agency complaints, particularly in relation to the perception by some complainants that they are caught in the middle, with neither agency taking responsibility for the complaint.

Addressing potential cross-agency issues – myGov and the ATO's electronic lodgement process for 2013–14

myGov is a service managed by the Department of Human Services (DHS). It allows users to link a range of Australian Government services with one username and password. For the 2013–14 tax year, taxpayers will be required to link their ATO account to a myGov account to be able to lodge their tax return electronically via e-tax or myTax.

We anticipated that taxpayers could be confused about which agency to contact if they experienced difficulties setting up an account. Our discussions with both agencies suggest that adequate arrangements are in place to deal with 'shared customer' issues.

We will report on the use of myGov at tax time in our 2014–15 Annual Report.

Earlier resolution of complaints – Second Chance Transfer programme

Under our Second Chance Transfer programme, we refer complaints that have been finalised by the ATO back to the ATO for reconsideration. We do this in cases where:

• the taxpayer has attempted to resolve the issue through the ATO's complaints process, but remains dissatisfied with the outcome
• the issue which led to the complaint is relatively uncomplicated
• we assess that the ATO is capable of offering a better outcome relatively quickly.

The process gives the ATO another opportunity to review the complaint and resolve any issues, potentially reducing the need for an Ombudsman investigation. The outcome of a referral back to the ATO is typically a quicker resolution of the issue for the complainant and an opportunity for the ATO to learn from complaints to further improve its own complaint-handling practices.

In 2013–14, 176 complaints were referred back to the ATO as second-chance transfers. Most of the complaints transferred as a part of this arrangement were successfully resolved by the ATO and did not return to our office for further or formal action.

Complaint themes

During 2013–14 complaints received by the Ombudsman about the ATO most commonly related to:

• delay in receiving income tax refunds
• debt-collection activities
• audits and reviews conducted by the ATO
• superannuation.

Income tax returns

In 2013–14 complaints relating to lodgement and processing issues accounted for almost 18% of all the ATO complaints we received.

The ATO's Income Tax Return Integrity (ITRI) programme detects income tax returns that may contain missing or incorrect information. This can lead to a delay in issuing a refund, even if the ATO ultimately determines the taxpayer's claims are correct.

The effect of ITRI first came to the Ombudsman's attention in 2011 following an influx of complaints concerning delays. We are pleased to note the ATO has taken into account the feedback provided by this office and has improved its communication with taxpayers regarding delays.

Debt collection

Debt collection remains a persistent cause for complaint to the Ombudsman. During 2013–14 about 21% of complaints about the ATO related to debt-collection activities.

We received complaints from small-business owners aggrieved about garnishee action taken by the ATO or the rejection of payment arrangements proposed by them. We recognise the ATO has an obligation to ensure taxpayers pay the correct amount of tax under the law, and we accept it is entitled to use garnishee action as a means of collection. Importantly, the ATO has continued to improve its response to cases involving hardship and exceptional or unusual circumstances.

The re-raising of debt is another common cause of complaint to the Ombudsman, as seen in the case above.

Audit and review

Complaints about the ATO's audit activity commonly relate to case selection, substantiation or a delay in finalising the audit. In 2013–14 about 10% of tax complaints related to audits.

When the ATO identifies an income tax return or GST claim that may contain incorrect or inadequate information, it may decide to undertake a thorough review before issuing a refund.

Complainants typically contact us when they:

• do not understand why they or their business have been selected for an audit
• are concerned at the amount of documentation the ATO has asked them to provide to substantiate their claims
• believe the audit is taking too long to finalise, and/or
• disagree with the ATO's decision to extend the audit beyond the terms initially advised, to include earlier periods or years.

The law provides taxpayers with the explicit right to object to, and seek a review of, the ATO's decisions, including through an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. We encourage taxpayers who disagree with an assessment by the ATO to exercise their objection and review rights.

Taxpayers may also seek compensation under the Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (CDDA) scheme if they believe they have suffered loss or damage as a result of defective administration by the ATO. A number of complainants have applied for compensation under this scheme in relation to decisions made by ATO audit and objection officers, as occurred in the example opposite.

Superannuation

In 2013–14 about 10% of ATO complaints we received related to superannuation and unpaid superannuation guarantee payments. Complaints are typically made by:

• individual employees concerned about the delay, lack of information or uncertainty about the ATO's progress towards collecting unpaid superannuation
• small-business owners who disagree with the audit actions related to an employee complaint
• Self-Managed Super Funds (SMSFs) with concerns regarding reporting and regulatory issues.

Other matters

Access issues

The ATO reduced the availability of printed products for the 2012–13 tax return period and required that some types of returns be lodged online only. The Individual Tax Return Instructions (the Tax Pack) are no longer available through newsagents. Instead, printed products are only available by order from the ATO (phone, online or shopfront).

This office received a small number of complaints about the decision to restrict or cease printed products. A common theme was that the move was seen as discriminatory against older Australians and those who did not have access to a computer, or were in a remote location with limited access to support. Some complainants were concerned that the move to online lodgement increased their exposure to cybercrime.

We generally referred these complaints back to the ATO under the Second Chance Transfer programme to give the ATO an opportunity to resolve the issue for the taxpayers, and to provide a better explanation of the reasons for the change in service arrangements.

We will continue to provide feedback to agencies to ensure the increasing move to online transactions does not impact unfairly on their clients, particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable members of the community.

Communication

During the year we provided feedback to the ATO about the need to better communicate issues that impact on taxpayers, a point acknowledged by the ATO in its 2012–13 Annual Report. Providing better information earlier is likely to reduce the need for a taxpayer to call the ATO to complain or query its actions.

The following case study provides an example of where an investigation resulted in better information being provided to taxpayers:

We continue to provide feedback to the ATO in relation to its letters and other communications with taxpayers. We note that the ATO is undertaking a special project to identify and review the top 10 letters that generate complaints or contact with its call centres.

During the year we raised with the ATO the issue of providing prompt advice to taxpayers about system errors or outages, particularly those that may lead to processing backlogs or unavoidable delays. We suggested to the ATO that providing early advice about delays on its website would help its clients set reasonable expectations about timeframes and would likely reduce the need for taxpayers to call the ATO with enquiries or complaints.

[Back to Top]

Immigration

Overview

The Immigration Ombudsman has oversight of the full range of functions undertaken by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. We inspect immigration detention facilities, provide the Minister with reports on people who have been in detention for more than two years, monitor the department's compliance and removals processes, and investigate complaints about the department's actions in relation to immigration and detention matters.

Complaints

The Immigration Ombudsman investigates the department in two streams: general complaints relating to visa, citizenship and other migration matters; and detention-related complaints.

The number of complaints we received about the department increased slightly over the previous year. We received 1,771 in 2013–14, compared with 1,547 in 2012–13, an increase of 14.5%. Of these we investigated 256, or 14%. Our complaints received regarding detention-related matters were 697, of which we investigated 140 (20%), and 1,074 general complaints, of which 116 (10%) were investigated.

Timeliness and responsiveness to Ombudsman's requests for information, particularly in relation to detention-related complaints, is one aspect of the relationship with the department that is a focus for improvement. This is important in meeting the Ombudsman's service charter and the expectations of complainants.

We have continued the process of 'warm transfer' of complaints introduced last year. This enables us to give the department a second opportunity to respond to a complainant without requiring investigation by this office. In 2013–14 we warm transferred 35 complaints.

A number of complainants have not been satisfied with the department's response to the transferred complaints and have come back to this office for us to reconsider them. There were nine such instances, and of those we undertook an investigation of five complaints.

Complaint themes and systemic issues

As in previous years, delay is the most common cause of complaint, particularly in relation to the processing of some visa categories – spouse and some skilled migration visas. Security assessment delays for asylum seekers are still a cause of complaint; however, this has lessened due to the cessation of processing of asylum claims for people who arrived by boat after 13 August 2012.

Management of detainee property in detention is also a concern, with these complaints mostly concerning property that is damaged or lost while it is in the custody of the detention facility management. This is a systemic issue that we are continuing to work with the department to resolve.

The issue of visa applications being refused is also a frequent cause of complaint, mostly as it relates to applications for visitor and student visas. It should be noted, however, that complaints to this office about visa refusals are a very small proportion of total visa applications.

As noted in last year's Annual Report, this office presented the department with a discussion paper on genuineness as it relates to visitor and student visa applications. We met with senior departmental staff to discuss our concerns. In relation to student visas, they responded with a detailed explanation of the Genuine Temporary Entrant requirement introduced in November 2011 as part of the Knight Review reforms.

The department provides support to visa processing officers with extensive policy training and a range of strategies in the temporary visa network to support good decision making. These strategies include regular communities of practice meetings, updates to standard operating procedures and a range of measures to improve quality assurance in the decision making process.

Stakeholder engagement

To strengthen our engagement with service providers, asylum seekers, advocacy groups and other stakeholders we held a series of community roundtables in Australian capital cities. The purpose of the roundtables was to inform stakeholders about the role of the Ombudsman and to listen to any concerns about the administration of the department's functions. To continue this engagement we have also begun publishing a quarterly e-newsletter to share news about our priorities and issues of interest.

Liaison with the department

We have regular meetings with the department. The Ombudsman meets quarterly with the Secretary to discuss significant matters. The Deputy Ombudsman and Senior Assistant Ombudsman meet six-weekly with the Senior Executive of the department to discuss emerging trends and policy directions. The Senior Assistant Ombudsman and directors meet quarterly with the department's Ombudsman and Human Rights Coordination Section and other relevant areas in the department.

We discuss a broad range of issues and provide the department with a quarterly report of trends in complaint numbers and issues, as well as updates on statutory reporting, compliance monitoring, detention inspections and intersecting Overseas Student Ombudsman activities. When requested, the department provides briefings on matters of interest to this office.

Following up recommendations from previous reports

In 2012 we published a report on the circumstances of the transfer of 22 detainees from Villawood Immigration Detention Centre (IDC) to the Silverwater Correctional Facility following a riot at Villawood IDC. The report made a number of recommendations, all of which were accepted by the department.

In 2013 we followed up with the department to observe how the changed policies and procedures had been implemented. We asked for details of all transfers from IDCs to correctional facilities in the previous 12 months, and on examining the information provided it was apparent that these transfers had been carried out with adherence to the new procedures. This office has not received any further complaints relating to this issue.

The Ombudsman is concerned about the mental health of people in the immigration detention network, particularly the high levels of self-harm. These concerns culminated in May 2013 with a report on suicide and self-harm in immigration detention. The report made nine recommendations, of which the department accepted three, accepted five in principle and noted one.

The department has informed us of the progress of the implementation of these recommendations, most of which have now been implemented. The Ombudsman remains concerned about suicide and self-harm within the Australian detention network, so we will continue to monitor critical self-harm incidents through detention visits and regular departmental reporting.

Compliance and monitoring

In August 2013 the Ombudsman began an own-motion investigation into the inspection and monitoring of the department's compliance activities involving locating, detaining and removing unlawful non-citizens from 1 January to 30 September 2013.

The investigation provides independent oversight of compliance functions. It also provides the department, the government and the public with a degree of assurance that the department's processes are lawful and in accordance with good practice. This is especially important as warrants under s 251 of the Migration Act (which allow Immigration officers to enter and search premises) are approved by a delegate within the department.

As part of the own-motion investigation, we conducted desktop reviews of s 251 warrants and associated documentation, and examined documentation for the removal from Australia of people including people removed under s 501 (criminal/charter).

In addition, we attended aspects of the department's training of compliance staff, presented sessions to training groups on the functions of the Ombudsman's office and observed field compliance operations in the following cities and towns:

• Canberra – 3 December 2013
• Sydney – 4 and 5 February 2014
• Melbourne – 24 and 25 February 2014
• Leeton – 19 March 2014
• Adelaide – 7 April 2014
• Perth (Australind) – 20 May 2014
• Bundaberg – 2 and 3 June 2014.

We also observed front-counter operations at departmental offices in Sydney, Brisbane and Perth and visited the Villawood IDC to speak to the removal team and a number of people detained for compliance activities.

Overall we did not identify any areas of significant or systemic concern and noted that departmental officers in the field acted in a professional manner.

People detained and later released as lawful non-citizens

Since 2011 the department has been providing the Ombudsman with six-monthly reports on people who were detained then later released from immigration detention as they were found to be lawful non-citizens.

In 2013–14 the department reported that out of the 4,219 people detained, there were 17 cases where people were later released as not unlawful. These 17 reported cases involved 23 people when family members were included. Notification deficiencies and case-law-affected issues were the main cause of release from detention.

Issues associated with valid notification of decisions and those arising from case law are often complex to investigate. It is clear the department makes enquiries before detaining people, but continues to investigate after detention to ensure the detention is lawful.

We are satisfied with the department's reporting and that detention was not the result of systemic issues or maladministration. However, we did express concern regarding the number of people who were being granted visas in error and that future reporting should reflect the actual number of people detained.

We have also highlighted the need to focus on identifying notification and case-law issues before the decision to detain.

Immigration detention reviews

Statutory reporting (two-year review reports)

After a person has been in immigration detention for two years, and every six months thereafter, the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection must give the Ombudsman a review, under s 486N of the Migration Act, relating to the circumstances of the person's detention.

Section 486O of the Act requires the Ombudsman to give the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection an assessment of the appropriateness of the arrangements for that person's detention. The Ombudsman also provides a de-identified version of the report to the Minister, which is tabled in the Parliament.

In 2013–14 the number of two-year detention reviews we received from the department decreased from the previous year. The office received 886 reviews in 2013–14 compared with 1,118 reviews in 2012–13 and 683 in 2011–2012. Of the 886 reviews, 161 were first reports of people who reached 24 months in immigration detention and 725 were subsequent reviews for people who were 30 months or longer in detention.

Many of the people subject to these reviews were released on Bridging, Protection or Temporary Humanitarian Concern visas, removed from Australia, detained in correctional centres or transferred to community detention. The Ombudsman is still required to provide an assessment even if the person has been released from detention since the s 486N review was provided.

We provided 666 assessments to the Minister in 2013–14, compared to 674 the previous year.

Information from this process provided a valuable insight into individual and systemic issues experienced by people in community detention. There is a risk of this cohort of detainees receiving less oversight and scrutiny by virtue of the fact that they are not detained in held facilities, but living in accommodation in the community throughout Australia.

The high number of cases we are required to assess continues to place considerable strain on the ability of the office to report to the Minister in a timely manner. To help manage the workload, from January 2014 we began providing the majority of reports in a revised tabular format. We also continued to examine options for discharging this statutory obligation to be able to meet anticipated increases in people reaching 24 months in immigration detention.

In May 2014 we implemented an electronic delivery system for all reports, thus reducing our requirement for printed material.

Trends and issues raised in the two-year reports include:

• the continued long-term detention (in some cases over four years) of people who have been found to be owed protection, but have received an adverse security clearance
• those who are in the cohort of detainees who have been found not to be owed protection, but are unwilling to return to their home country voluntarily
• detainees who have been found to be owed protection, but have been waiting for more than two years for a security clearance
• placement recommendations for individuals to be nearer to family support.

Immigration Detention Review and Inspections

The Immigration Ombudsman oversights immigration detention and has done so since the introduction of the role in 2005. The function has been realigned over recent years to focus on the legislative, policy and procedural compliance and administrative actions undertaken in regard to immigration detainees.

During 2013–14 our teams visited the immigration detention facilities listed in Table 2.1

Table 2.1: Immigration detention facilities visited in 2013–14

During this inspection period there was a substantial change in government policy on Illegal Maritime Arrivals (IMAs), including the mandatory transfer of all IMAs who arrived after 19 July 2013 to Offshore Processing Centres (OPC) located on Nauru and Manus Island.

The key issues arising over this reporting period include:

• separation of family groups
• access to legal support for screened-out detainees
• management of detainees' personal property
• provision of welfare support to detainees
• inconsistency in access to mobile telephones.

Family separation including young adult males

We noted a shortfall in the policy guiding the management of family groups, which resulted in a significant number of families being separated and adult males being placed in facilities away from the extended family group they travelled with.

Of particular concern was the variation in interpretation of what constitutes a family and, in the absence of clear guidelines and policy, an over-reliance on the views of local managers to determine how family groups are managed and placed. The result is a significant variation in:

• definitions of what constitutes a family group
• placement considerations for partnered family members (fiancés etc) within the larger family group
• how mutually supportive groups that are not immediate family are managed
• how individuals claiming a family connection are managed
• the level of evidentiary material required to be considered as a family or partnered, including same-sex partners.

We are particularly concerned about the approach adopted in relation to young adult males who are removed from their family on their 18th birthday and placed into an Immigration Detention Centre. From our observations there appears to be little evidence to support this action.

We are concerned that it is premised on a view that once a male turns 18 they will engage in sexually predatory behaviour and will pose a significant risk to minors if they are retained in an Alternative Place of Detention (APOD) in the company of their family or established support networks. A review of all incidents involving males in a specific APOD did not support this view, nor do academic and professional studies support the separation and further isolation of young men from their family and support networks, noting that many are the head of their family unit.

Access to legal support – screened-out detainees

We have noted that neither Christmas Island nor Villawood IDC has provided suitable facilities or information to detainees who have been screened out to facilitate access to legal advice. We acknowledge that the Migration Act provides for the Department of Immigration and Border Protection to facilitate access on request. However, it raises the issue of reasonable understanding; that is, how does a detainee know that they may request access if they are not informed?

Management of detainee property

During this reporting period we focused on the manner in which detainee property was managed, including the introduction of the revised detainee property Policy and Procedure Manual (PPM). We noted:

• an absence of CCTV coverage in most facilities to provide coverage of both property recording and storage of in-trust and valuable property
• compliance with the respective policies, guidelines and procedural manuals was variable

• property that does not accompany detainees on transfer has a significantly higher risk of being lost or not located at the time of a detainee's discharge or transfer to an Offshore Processing Centre
• poor record keeping that fails to clearly describe the items kept in-trust
• inaccurate or inappropriate recording of valuables
• failure to issue receipts for valuables and/or in-trust property.

Provision of welfare support to detainees

The provision of welfare services across the immigration detention network is variable. Serco is compliant with its contractual obligations; however, the quality and use of the welfare structure varies and is dependent on the quality of the manager and staff to produce a good product.

During this reporting period we noted:

• consistent issues with placement of family groups within regional facilities (see separation of families issue)
• a high percentage of staff allocated to welfare sections are enthusiastic, but lack the prerequisite training and qualifications identified in the Serco position descriptions
• staff allocated to undertake self-harm assessment interviews were generally property staff who had not received training in undertaking this assessment. It should also be noted that this assessment is intended to be conducted as a concurrent activity with the property process during induction, therefore causing a conflict of priorities for property staff.

In relation to welfare clothing, improvements were noted. However, there is still a need to consider gender, age and culture in selection of clothing. This issue was particularly noted in IDCs which transitioned to APODs.

Access to mobile telephones in immigration detention facilities

There is ongoing inconsistency in the policy applied to detainees regarding access to and carriage of mobile telephones. IMAs are not permitted to have mobile phones in their possession, while all other categories of detainees are. This generates confusion in those facilities with a mixed cohort, management challenges when moving IMAs from facilities where they have had access, and supports an active black market.

The issues we have identified with access to legal support, detainee property and access to mobile phones are being raised with the department in separate issues papers and will be subjects of further discussion.

[Back to Top]

Overseas Students Ombudsman

The Overseas Students Ombudsman has three roles:

• investigate individual complaints about the actions or decisions of a private-registered education provider in connection with an intending, current or former overseas student
• work with private-registered education providers to promote best-practice handling of overseas students' complaints
• report on trends and broader issues that arise from complaint investigations.

Complaint trends and themes

In 2013–14 we received 518 complaints about private-registered education providers in connection with overseas students. This reflects an increase of 14 per cent from last financial year.

We started 233 complaint investigations and completed 244 investigations, compared to 189 investigations started and completed last year. This includes some investigations commenced in the previous financial year.

The top four types of complaints the Overseas Students Ombudsman received were about:

• refunds and fees disputes (200 complaints)
• providers' decisions to refuse a student transfer to another provider under Standard 7 of the National Code (107 complaints/external appeals)
• providers' decisions to report students to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) for failing to meet attendance requirements under Standard 11 (95 complaints/external appeals)
• providers' decisions to report students to DIBP for failing to meet course progress requirements under Standard 10 (55 complaints/external appeals).

We closed 282 complaints without the need to investigate, compared to 258 last year, because:

• we were able to form a view on the basis of the documents provided by the student, without the need to contact the education provider to investigate, or
• we referred the student back to their education provider's internal complaints and appeals process first, or
• we transferred the complaint to another complaint-handling body which could deal with the issue more effectively, as required by s 19ZK of the Act.

In 2013–14 we transferred 81 complaint issues to other complaint-handling bodies arising from 75 complaints, including:

• two complaints about discrimination to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (one last year)
• 34 complaints to the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA) relating to the quality or registration of a course (22 last year)
• three complaints to the Office of the Training Advocate relating to private education providers in South Australia (none last year)
• 40 complaints to the Tuition Protection Service (TPS) (14 last year) about provider closures and provider refunds due to student visa refusals
• one complaint to the Victorian Registration and Qualifications Authority (VRQA) relating to the quality or registration of a Victorian school (none last year).

Reports to the regulators

The Overseas Students Ombudsman has the power to disclose information regarding providers of concern to the national regulators, ASQA or the Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency (TEQSA).

In 2013–14 we used our power on five occasions to report to ASQA details of complaints where it appeared to us that a private provider may have breached the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 or the National Code, and we considered it was in the public interest to advise the national regulator of the details. Last year we reported on eight.

Once we provide this information, it is up to ASQA to decide what regulatory action, if any, it should take. We did not make any disclosures to TEQSA in 2013–14.

Trends and systemic issues

Problems with written agreements

We have been investigating more complaints about student refunds and fee disputes due to the high incidence of non-compliant written agreements prepared by education providers and signed by overseas students. A written agreement sets out the terms and conditions of their enrolment, including the refund policy.

In February and June 2014 we developed and delivered training on common mistakes providers make that invalidate their written agreements. This training was done through the professional development programmes of the peak bodies, English Australia (EA) and the Australian Council for Private Education and Training (ACPET).

Written agreements issues paper

We have drafted an issues paper on written agreements, which will be circulated to the education provider and international student peak bodies in the first quarter of 2014–15. The purpose of the paper is to consult with them about the best way to improve provider compliance with the legal requirements for written agreements/enrolment contracts.

This may include the development of standard-form clauses to minimise the opportunity for error, leading to disputes and the education provider having to pay a refund or not pursue outstanding fees when they would otherwise be able to.

Overseas Student Health Cover issues paper

In 2013–14 we identified problems with some private-registered education providers failing to arrange Overseas Students Health Cover (OSHC) for students who had paid them the premium. In each case the provider had also falsely reported to the Department of Education (DE) and DIBP that they had arranged the cover. This caused the students to breach their visa conditions and left them without cover, until our office investigated the matters.

We reported the providers to the regulator. We also used the complaints to consider the administration of OSHC by education providers, DE, DIBP, the Department of Health and the five OSHC insurers more broadly. After consulting with these organisations we identified a number of areas for improvement. These will be detailed in an issues paper on the topic to be published in the first quarter of 2014–15.

Overseas student complaint statistics

In 2012–13 the Overseas Students Ombudsman worked with the state and territory Ombudsman offices and the South Australian Training Advocate to explore ways to generate overseas student complaint statistics that can be compared across jurisdictions. Given that offices collect different data, we concluded this was something to aspire to over the longer term. We continue to publish quarterly statistics on our website at www.oso.gov.au which will allow the identification of trends in complaint issues relating to private-registered providers over time.

Stakeholder engagement and promoting best-practice complaint handling

In 2013–14 we promoted best-practice complaint handling through our e-newsletters to overseas students and private-registered education providers. We also delivered presentations at key industry conferences including training to overseas students at the Council for International Students Australia conference and presentations to education providers at the Australian Council for Private Education and Training and English Australia conferences.

We met with relevant stakeholders to discuss issues relating to overseas student complaints. This included meetings, workshops or other events with the Australian Federation of International Students, Victorian International Student Care Service, Consumer Action Law Centre Victoria, Redfern Legal Centre's International Student Legal Advice Service, Council for International Students Western Australia, Independent Schools Council Queensland, Office of the Training Advocate South Australia, Western Australian Private Education and Training Industry Association, Western Australian International Education Conciliator, Australian Human Rights Commission and the Fair Work Ombudsman.

In addition, we held regular liaison meetings with ASQA, TEQSA, the TPS, DE and DIBP to discuss issues relating to international education and overseas student complaints.

[Back to Top]

Defence Force Ombudsman

The office received 518 complaints about Defence agencies in 2013–14, compared with 509 complaints the previous year. Defence agencies include the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and cadets, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA), the Defence Housing Authority, as well as the Department of Defence (Defence).

Complaints from serving or former members of the ADF are investigated by the Defence Force Ombudsman. Complaints typically involve ADF employment-related matters including:

• pay and conditions
• entitlements and benefits
• promotions
• discharge.

Defence-related complaints from members of the public are investigated under the Commonwealth Ombudsman jurisdiction. Typically, these matters involve military aircraft noise, contracting arrangements, and decisions and service-delivery issues.

Our office may also consider specific requests from Defence to undertake complex or sensitive investigations using the Ombudsman's own-motion powers. One such investigation was undertaken by the Ombudsman this year.

[Back to Top]

Law Enforcement Ombudsman, Inspections and Reviews

The independent oversight process

The table below gives an overview of our inspection and review activities in 2013–14.

Table 2.2: Inspections and reviews conducted 2013–14

Our approach

For each inspection and review function we perform, we develop a set of methodologies that we apply consistently across all agencies. These methodologies, or 'tool kits', comprise test plans, risk registers, checklists and templates. The tool kits are based on legislative requirements and best-practice standards in auditing, and ensure the integrity of each inspection and review. It is also our practice to regularly review these tool kits to ensure their effectiveness.

We give required notice to each agency of our intention to inspect their records and provide them with a broad outline of our inspection or review criteria. This focuses agencies on what we will be assessing and the types of records they need to provide. It also minimises unnecessary effort by agencies – and surprises.

To ensure procedural fairness we provide a draft report on our findings to the agency for comment before it is finalised. Depending on our reporting requirements under each function, the finalised report is either presented to the relevant Minister or forms the basis of our published reports. They also inform any briefings we prepare for parliamentary committees. For our published reports, we remove reference to any sensitive information that could undermine or compromise law enforcement.

As well as our published reports, during 2013–14 we made four submissions to parliamentary inquiries. Our contribution to these public debates was informed by inspection and review findings. All of these submissions and published reports are available on our website.

New oversight activities in 2013–14

During 2013–14 we conducted our first round of inspections of agencies' preservation notice records under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). Law enforcement agencies give carriers preservation notices to prevent carriers from destroying stored communications before they can be accessed in accordance with the Act.

We will be reporting on the outcomes of these inspections to the Attorney-General after 30 June 2014, in accordance with the Act. As we do not have a public reporting mechanism under the TIA Act, it is the Attorney-General's Department's practice to include a summary of our findings in its published TIA Act Annual Report.

We also reported on our first review findings under the FWBI Act of Fair Work Building and Construction's use of its coercive examination powers.

In addition, the Court Security Act 2013 commenced on 1 January 2014. Section 36 of the Act requires the administrative head of the Family Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to report to the Ombudsman at the end of each financial year on complaints that were made in that year about the conduct of a security officer, or an authorised court officer purporting to exercise a power or perform a duty in relation to Court premises, along with details about how each complaint was handled.

We received the first such report this year, providing details of four complaints and their handling.  Further information on the operations of the Family Court and Federal Circuit Court is available on their websites.

Law Enforcement Ombudsman

When performing functions in relation to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Ombudsman may also be called the Law Enforcement Ombudsman. We have a comprehensive role in the oversight of the AFP, in addition to our inspections of its use of covert powers, which includes:

• investigating complaints about the AFP
• receiving mandatory notifications from the AFP regarding complaints about serious misconduct involving AFP members, under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (AFP Act)
• annual statutory reviews of the AFP's administration of Part V of the AFP Act.

In 2013–14 we received 227 complaints about the AFP, compared to 338 in 2012–13. Of these we investigated 29.

Outreach and education activities

We value engagement with agencies outside of complaints, inspection and review processes as it provides the opportunity to discuss best practices and risks, and fosters a common understanding of each other's roles and processes. During 2013–14 we:

• provided training to AFP members who manage complaints about the AFP, at the request of the AFP
• were invited to adjudicate debates about integrity issues conducted by AFP recruits as a part of their training to become sworn officers

• met with agencies within our jurisdiction who applied their covert and intrusive powers for the first time, to provide an overview of our inspection role and discuss best practices and common issues
• provided comments on agencies' policies and procedures, highlighting potential risks to compliance, at the request of agencies
• were invited to participate in a workshop held by the New South Wales Police Force, to review and update its policies and procedures on the use of some of its powers under the TIA Act
• were invited to meet with the Australian Crime Commission to discuss changes to its practices and procedures, which may affect the conduct of our inspections
• were invited to present to key AFP compliance areas at an AFP training forum on its use of covert and intrusive powers, where we discussed relevant best practices and our inspection role
• provided guidance to visiting Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea staff on how to develop methodologies for conducting review and inspection functions
• initiated meetings with other inspecting authorities to discuss practices and approaches.

At these workshops, training sessions and forums, agencies demonstrated their commitment to a high level of compliance supported by sound administrative practices.

[Back to Top]

Public Interest Disclosure scheme

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (the PID Act) commenced on 15 January 2014. The Act established the first comprehensive disclosure-protection scheme for current and former public officials that belong to Australian Government agencies.

The Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) have an oversight and awareness-raising role under the PID Act. The Act, however, places responsibility on Australian Government agencies to have procedures in place to proactively manage, investigate and resolve disclosures, and to support and protect public officials from reprisal action as a result of making a disclosure. It also places obligations on public officials to help agencies conduct an investigation, and assist the Ombudsman and IGIS in the performance of their functions under the Act.

In the lead-up to the start of the Act we undertook a significant body of work to help prepare agencies to implement the PID scheme effectively. We developed a set of legislated PID Standards, which provide additional guidance to agencies in the operation of the scheme. We also developed a suite of guidelines, fact sheets, frequently asked questions and notification forms to help agencies and disclosers navigate the new legislative framework.

In the first six months of the scheme we focused on helping and supporting agencies to implement the Act, so they were well placed to handle and take ownership of any reported wrongdoing.

We delivered a large number of presentations to agencies about the operation and application of the Act. We also handled a significant number of enquiries from agencies and individuals seeking guidance in relation to the Act. This included holding a number of meetings with agencies to discuss and help them with implementation issues.

Overview of the PID scheme

The PID scheme aims to remove barriers that might otherwise prevent officials working within the Commonwealth public sector from reporting suspected wrongdoing that impacts on public administration. It aims to promote integrity and accountability within the Commonwealth public sector by:

• placing responsibility on Australian Government agencies to proactively manage public interest disclosure issues
• encouraging and facilitating disclosure of suspected wrongdoing in the public sector
• ensuring that public officials who make public interest disclosures are supported and protected from adverse consequences
• ensuring that disclosures by public officials are properly investigated and dealt with.

Under the Act, responsibility rests with Australian Government agencies to ensure that suspected wrongdoing is appropriately investigated and, to the extent possible, resolved. The Act requires that agencies effectively facilitate reporting of wrongdoing; receive, allocate and investigate PIDs; support and protect disclosers; and comply with a set of notification and reporting requirements.

Role of the Ombudsman

The PID Act identifies a number of roles for the Ombudsman including:

• setting standards relating to:
  • procedures for principal officers of agencies to follow when dealing with internal disclosures
  • conducting investigations under the Act
  • preparing reports of investigations under the Act
  • agencies providing information and assistance to the Ombudsman
  • keeping records.
• providing assistance to principal officers, authorised officers, public officials, former public officials and IGIS
• conducting awareness and education programmes for agencies and public officials
• receiving, allocating and investigating disclosures about other agencies
• receiving notifications of allocations and decisions not to investigate, or not investigate further
• determining extensions of time for the investigation of disclosures, following requests from agencies and informing disclosers of our decision where we have decided to grant an extension
• reporting annually to the Minister for tabling of the report in the parliament on the operation of the scheme.

The Ombudsman can also investigate complaints concerning an agency's investigation of a PID and conduct own-motion investigations under the Ombudsman Act. The Ombudsman is also required to handle disclosures made about its own public officials.

A specialist Public Interest Disclosure team was established within the Ombudsman's office to support this allocation, coordination, monitoring and assistance role.

Role of IGIS

IGIS performs a similar role to the Ombudsman in respect of the six intelligence agencies that are prescribed under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. These roles include:

• providing assistance to principal officers, authorised officers, public officials, former public officials and the Ombudsman
• conducting awareness and education programmes for intelligence agencies and their public officials
• receiving, allocating and investigating disclosures about intelligence agencies
• receiving notifications of allocations and decisions not to investigate, or not investigate further in relation to the intelligence agencies
• determining extensions of time for the investigation of disclosures by the intelligence agencies.

Role of agencies

Agencies play a central role in the operation of the PID Act and its ongoing success. Among other responsibilities under the Act, the principal officer of an agency is responsible for fostering an environment that encourages the disclosure of suspected wrongdoing. It is only through strong agency commitment that public officials will have the confidence to trust and use the scheme and make disclosures.

The Act applies to 191 agencies and prescribed authorities under its jurisdiction. Many are Commonwealth agencies that operate under the Australian Public Service (APS) framework and are familiar with the responsibilities and accountability mechanisms associated with it.

Small authorities, committees and Commonwealth companies that have a separate legal identity but most of their resources, such as staff, are from a larger agency are also included as separate agencies under the Act.

Some of these prescribed authorities have historically used the corporate services of their parent agency, usually a department, to provide complaints and investigative services on their behalf. However, the PID Act requires that principal officers of each agency and prescribed authority develop their own procedures and take responsibility for the investigation of their disclosures, as well as protect their public officials. The implementation of the PID Act may have been a greater challenge for some of these agencies.

For the purposes of preparing this Annual Report, as well as for ongoing monitoring, the Ombudsman's office and IGIS conducted a short survey of all agencies within the jurisdiction of the Act.

We would like to acknowledge the responsiveness of agencies in completing the survey. We received responses from all of the 191 agencies included in the survey.

Implementation trends and themes

The figures reported are based on the information agencies provided to our office as part of the Annual Report survey. We acknowledge there were some discrepancies with the information that some agencies reported, which displayed some fundamental misunderstanding with the application of the Act.

Total number of disclosures

Since the commencement of the Act, 48 of 191 agencies¹ received one or more PIDs. Within those 48 agencies, 378² disclosures were made by public officials, former public officials or people taken to be public officials.3

These disclosures met the threshold requirements for the information to be an internal disclosure, including satisfying at least one of a number of categories of 'disclosable conduct' under the Act.

The categories of disclosable conduct in the Act are conduct by an agency, public official or contracted service provider that:

• contravenes a Commonwealth, state or territory law
• contravenes a foreign law that applies to the agency, official or service provider
• perverts the course of justice
• is corrupt
• constitutes maladministration, including conduct that is based on improper motives or is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or negligent
• is an abuse of public trust
• involves fabrication, falsification, plagiarism or deception relating to scientific research, or other misconduct in relation to scientific research, analysis or advice
• results in wastage of public money or public property
• unreasonably endangers health and safety
• endangers the environment
• involves an abuse of position or is grounds for disciplinary action.

Half of the 378 disclosures made were classified by agencies as allegations about conduct that could amount to a contravention of a law of the Commonwealth, state or territory.

This is a broad category that can incorporate wrongdoing in the other categories, including maladministration or a breach of the Code of Conduct under the Public Service Act 1999. Code of Conduct disclosures could range from incorrectly recording hours of attendance on a flex sheets to other more serious matters. Rarely would a contravention of law disclosure relate to criminal behaviour.

Figure 2.1 represents a breakdown of the type of disclosable conduct reported by authorised officers of each agency. Note that some disclosures raised more than one issue and therefore had more than one category of disclosable conduct recorded against them.

It should be borne in mind that that the data below reflects the information provided by the discloser, rather than the result of any investigation, and that not all PIDs result in an investigation.

Figure 2.1: Types of disclosable conduct

Agencies that reported the most disclosures were the Department of Defence, with 181 disclosures, and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), with 61 disclosures.⁴

Both these agencies have a large number of public officials. Defence includes departmental staff, members of the Australian Defence Force, reservists and cadets. DIBP includes a large number of contracted service providers.

Before the commencement of the PID Act, Defence received similar levels of reporting under a previous Defence whistleblower scheme. Defence and DIBP are also very active in awareness-raising and training for staff and contracted service providers. For example, we understand that DIBP implemented mandatory training covering the PID scheme for all staff.

Consequently the high figures may also be attributed to the knowledge of staff in relation to the Act. Furthermore, we are aware of the proactive steps both departments have taken to successfully implement the PID Act, including:

• integrating other mandatory and voluntary reporting requirements to fit within the PID scheme
• adopting a broad definition of 'supervisor' to allow public officials to report a PID to a person within their line management or, in the case of Defence, their chain of command
• having in place an appropriate network of authorised officers to ensure that public officials can readily access an authorised officer.

These positive steps, together with the large number of public officials, are likely to have contributed to the high PID figures in these two agencies. We also note that both agencies were involved in establishing a 'community of practice' with other large Commonwealth agencies to raise awareness and share better practice in managing PIDs.

Number of reports that did not meet the PID Act requirements

Fifty-two agencies recorded the number of approaches from people wishing to make a disclosure that did not meet the threshold requirements for their information to be considered an internal disclosure.

Within those 52 agencies, 286 approaches were received from potential disclosers where the report of wrongdoing did not amount to an internal disclosure.⁵

Figure 2.2 is a breakdown of the reasons the agencies considered that the reported information did not amount to disclosable conduct under the Act.

Given that agencies identified 'other reasons' why they assessed that the information did not amount to disclosable conduct in 45% of cases, we further analysed their responses. Table 2.3 outlines our assessment of the top six other reasons based on each agency's more detailed explanation for selecting this category when responding to our survey.

Figure 2.2: Reasons information did not amount to a PID

Table 2.3: Other reasons the matter did not amount to disclosable conduct

The reasons set out in Table 2.3 may highlight some misunderstanding that agencies have in applying the PID Act. In particular, agencies declining to accept a matter as disclosable conduct or a PID because it did not amount to serious disclosable conduct, or because the discloser did not wish to pursue the matter further.

These are not grounds that an agency's authorised officer can take into account when considering whether the information meets the disclosable conduct threshold and requirements of an internal disclosure. The seriousness of the disclosable conduct and the discloser's view are considerations that a delegated investigation officer can take into account when exercising discretion not to investigate a matter further.

Some of the categories in Table 2.3, such as 'Reported through normal processes' and 'Insufficient information', are likely to reflect circumstances where the requirements for making an internal disclosure may not have been met. For example, the information may not have been provided to an authorised internal recipient or there may have been a lack of sufficient information to tend to show disclosable conduct.

The majority of agencies (more than 70%), do not record an approach from a person wanting to make a disclosure if the approach does not meet the threshold requirements for the information to be considered an internal disclosure.

While it is not a requirement of the Act to maintain such records, it is interesting to note that agencies received 75% more PID-related approaches that needed to be considered, assessed and a decision made, in addition to the total number of approaches assessed to be disclosures.

We consider that the practice of recording all approaches, and the reasons that some are not considered to be disclosures under the Act, can be a valuable source of information for individual agencies.

Where a decision has been made not to allocate a PID, agencies are required to inform the discloser of the reasons the matter was not allocated and alternative avenues to have their matter dealt with.

Capturing this information can help agencies ensure their authorised officers are complying with the requirements of the Act. Additionally, over time the data may highlight misunderstandings with certain aspects of the Act and identify future training and guidance needs.

Action taken in response to PIDs

During this reporting period, which covers almost six months of the PID Act's operation, 34 agencies reported that they conducted 223 investigations. Of the 378 disclosures allocated, agencies reported that they referred more than 44% (168) of investigations to be conducted under another law of the Commonwealth, pursuant to s 47(3) of the PID Act.

The majority of these investigations (38%) related to a disclosure about an employment- or Code of Conduct-related matter, which can be investigated under the Public Service Act 1999 or the Fair Work Act 2009.

Of the 223 investigations conducted, agencies reported making 91 decisions to exercise discretion under s 48 of the PID Act not to investigate a matter (or not to investigate a matter further). The primary reason that agencies reported for exercising this discretion was that the matters did not amount to serious disclosable conduct.

Figure 2.3 is a breakdown of the reasons agencies reported for having exercised discretion not to further investigate a disclosure.

Figure 2.3: Reasons agencies exercised discretion not to investigate a disclosure

Outcomes of PID investigations

The Public Interest Disclosure Standard 2013 requires agencies to provide certain information to the Ombudsman including the:

• number of PIDs received during the year
• kinds of disclosable conduct in those PIDs
• number of PID investigations completed
• action 'taken during the relevant financial year in response to recommendations in reports relating to disclosure investigations'.

Table 2.6 summarises the information that agencies provided about the actions taken in response to the recommendations in PID reports. Unfortunately we have not been able to draw any meaningful conclusions from that data to enable us to make broad observations about the success of the PID scheme as a means for identifying and addressing wrongdoing.

We would like to be able to include in our future reports some detailed information about the operation of the scheme across the Commonwealth. We think it would be useful to report aggregated information about the average times taken to conduct investigations, and the number of times that agencies exceeded statutory period of 90 days.

We also consider that it would be appropriate to report aggregated data about the instances of disclosable conduct established in the investigations, and the number and nature of each recommendation made to address disclosable conduct.

Accordingly, in the coming year we intend reviewing the type and frequency of the information that we require agencies to provide us about their administration of the PID scheme.

Types of disclosers

A total of 378 disclosures were reported, made by 369 individuals, of whom 102 (28%) chose to remain anonymous. There were cases where one person made a number of different disclosures. Some disclosures were made by more than one person.

Almost 80% of disclosers were current public officials (excluding contractors). The remainder were former public officials, contractors or people that the agency deemed to be public officials for the purposes of making a PID.

The number of agencies that deemed a person to be a public official is positive. It shows that agencies are taking an interest in and responsibility for the reported wrongdoing and willing to operate in the spirit of the PID Act.

Figure 2.4 represents a breakdown of the types of disclosers.

Figure 2.4: Types of disclosers

Awareness raising and training

The majority of agencies (74%) reported that they conducted PID-specific awareness raising and/or training to their staff. However, only 20% reported that they had conducted awareness raising to their contracted service providers.

This may reflect the extent of services that are contracted out by agencies; however, we believe there is scope for greater focus on this group when agencies seek to raise awareness of the PID scheme.

Positive examples where agencies have taken a proactive approach to awareness raising and training include:

• the development of training modules
• key messages on computer screen savers
• PID presentations to staff, including those delivered by this office
• targeted training to authorised officers, supervisors and contracted service providers.

Taking responsibility for awareness raising for former public officials and contracted service providers presents a challenge for all agencies. For some agencies that contract out significant areas of their work, providing PID-related information, support and training to those providers will form an important and necessary aspect of their ongoing PID awareness raising and training.

IGIS noted that each of the intelligence agencies devoted appropriate resources to spreading awareness of the PID scheme before, and in the weeks following, the scheme coming into effect.

To help raise awareness, senior agency managers in the intelligence agencies expressed support for the principles underpinning the scheme, information material was circulated on agency intranets and presentations about all aspects of the scheme, including the role of IGIS, were delivered.

IGIS staff were consulted during the development of these awareness-raising activities and also spoke at a number of question and answer seminars.

IGIS staff also participated in meetings of the intelligence agency PID working group, to address any issues of concern, and to learn from the experiences of the intelligence agencies in handling PID matters.

Observations about agency progress from January to June 2014

The PID Act requires that principal officers of agencies fulfil a number of key obligations including:

• establishing procedures for facilitating and dealing with disclosures, including assessing risks that reprisals may be taken against the discloser and providing for confidentiality of the investigative process
• taking reasonable steps to protect public officials who belong to their agency from detriment or threats of detriment
• ensuring the number of authorised officers are readily accessible and that public officials who belong to their agency are aware of the identity of each authorised officer within their agency
• ensuring appropriate action is taken in response to recommendations, or other matters raised, following a disclosure investigation report.

Access to agencies' PID information

Early enquiries, complaints and disclosures to our office indicated that not all agencies had PID procedures in place on 15 January 2014. Since the commencement of the Act we have received four enquiries from current public officials wishing to make a disclosure, but who could not do so because they were unaware of the relevant agency's PID policy and procedures.

Our follow-up resulted in those agencies providing that information to the public officials. The agencies also published their PID procedures on their intranet sites, as well as publishing information on their external websites about making a disclosure.

Between 21 and 28 January 2014 we undertook a desktop audit of the agencies within the jurisdiction of the Act to ascertain how many provided information on their website about making a PID.

While we acknowledge that some agencies may have had information, including having their PID procedures available on their intranet site, it appeared that most agencies failed to make PID-related information available to public officials covered by the Act but who did not have access to the agency's intranet, such as former staff and contracted service providers.

The audit revealed that less than 15% of agencies had, on their publicly accessible websites, information about how to make a PID. A further desktop audit was completed between 20 February and 3 March 2014, which showed that 30% of agencies had PID information available on their external websites.

Through our recent Annual Report survey we have identified that nearly 75% of agencies now have information available on their intranet and almost 65% of agencies on their external website.

Authorised officers and investigation officers

More than 90% of agencies that responded to the survey indicated they have appointed authorised officers. Agencies reported that in deciding how many and who to appoint, they mainly took into consideration the size of the agency, the substantive level of staff and the substantive role or position of staff.

Enquiries to this office indicated that, initially, agencies limited the appointment of authorised officers to very senior staff or a small team often in the human resources or corporate areas. In some cases, this limited the accessibility of authorised officers as well as creating the potential for conflicts of interest to arise, whereby the information disclosed related to the team or group of people appointed to receive the disclosure.

Almost 60% of agencies had delegated investigation officers for the purposes of the Act. Again, enquiries to this office indicated that delegated investigation officers were often from a small team that was previously responsible for investigating Code of Conduct and/or whistleblower complaints.

Of the agencies that indicated they had not delegated any investigation officers, some said they intended to contract or outsource any investigations to either another agency or body as and when the need arose.

In such cases it is still necessary for the agency to delegate the investigation function to the contracted service provider as well as ensure that the provider belongs to the agency. Further, smaller agencies or prescribed authorities cannot enter into an arrangement with a larger agency to conduct an investigation for it.

Over time we have observed a number of agencies broadening their authorisations and delegations to members of different teams and geographical locations. This has minimised the potential for a conflict to arise as well as making authorised officers more accessible to public officials.

Issues arising from the interpretation of the PID Act

Application of s 47(3) of the PID Act

We are concerned that some agencies may be placing undue emphasis on the application of s 47(3) as a separate category of decision making, contrary to the spirit and the requirements of the Act. Through enquiries and complaints made to our office and our analysis of agency responses to our survey, we have become aware that agencies are referring almost 50% of disclosures for investigation under a different law of the Commonwealth pursuant to s 47(3) of the Act.

Once a matter has been assessed as a PID and allocated, the Act requires that the matter be investigated, unless discretion is exercised not to investigate that disclosure under one of the grounds set out under s 48.

Section 47(3) allows an agency to consider whether a different investigation should be conducted under another law of the Commonwealth, after it considers the substance and merits of the information being disclosed.

If an agency chooses to conduct a different type of investigation, it must still finalise the PID investigation. Whenever an agency decides to finalise any PID investigation, it must prepare an investigation report under s 51 that explains its findings about whether there has been one or more instances of disclosable conduct, even if a further investigation under another Commonwealth law is to be conducted.

The agency is also obliged to provide the s 51 report to the discloser, although some redactions are permitted, if the information is of a type that would not be released to the discloser if he or she were to make an application under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.

Some agencies appear to be automatically applying s 47(3) as a mechanism for finalising an investigation under the PID Act and referring the matter for a different investigation under a different law without appropriately considering the substance and merits of the information being disclosed.

This has led to a degree of dissatisfaction and confusion from some disclosers about the conduct and potential outcomes of PID investigations. In some cases this has been compounded by agencies not complying with the requirement to prepare and provide an investigation report to the discloser as required under s 51.

We will work with agencies in the coming year to reinforce the proper use of s 47(3), and the requirement to provide a report to the discloser under s 51.

Allocation process vs investigation process

The Act distinguishes the initial process of assessing and allocating a PID, and the subsequent process of investigating it. Each phase requires different considerations by different officers: the allocation by an authorised officer and the investigation by a delegated investigation officer.

Enquiries and complaints to our office identified some agencies making assessments and allocation decisions based on considerations that should only be applied in the investigation stage. This was also verified from the results of the Annual Report survey.

For example, the Act allows an investigation officer to exercise discretion not to investigate a disclosure on the basis that the information does not concern 'serious disclosable conduct'.

The determination of seriousness should not form part of an authorised officer's consideration of whether the information from the discloser tends to show conduct that meets the threshold of 'disclosable conduct' under the Act.

However, some agencies appear to be incorrectly considering at the assessment phase, before allocation, whether the information disclosed was serious even though it met the threshold of disclosable conduct.

Although this may not have changed the outcome (because an investigation officer was likely to conclude that the disclosure was not one that required investigation), it nevertheless led the agency to incorrectly classify the matter as a report that was not a PID under the Act.

We will work with agencies in the coming year to reinforce the proper application of the test for determining whether a disclosure concerns conduct that meets the threshold for a PID.

Unintended consequences in the application of the PID Act

Through our implementation of the PID scheme, and our contact with agencies seeking clarity about the scheme's scope and application, we have identified unintended consequences with some aspects of the Act. Two areas of confusion in the PID scheme are the role of supervisors and the role of former public officials who seek to represent others.

In our view, a strict application of the Act in these circumstances may lead to an unintended expansion of the scheme and possibly undermine the protections for public officials who identify and report suspected wrongdoing. This is leading to confusion on the part of many public officials responsible for the implementation and administration of the PID scheme in their agencies.

The Ombudsman's office is providing support and clarification to agencies to assist them to sensibly navigate through these issues. However, in order to provide greater certainty, we believe these issues should be explored and considered for possible legislative amendment.

In saying this, we note the Act requires that a review of the scheme is required to commence in January 2016.

Supervisors and scope of the PID Act

Section 60A of the Act imposes special obligations on all supervisors. A supervisor is obliged to pass on to an authorised officer any information they receive from any public official they supervise, if they believe on reasonable grounds that the information could concern disclosable conduct.

It is not necessary for the public official to assert to their supervisor, or even intend, that the information be disclosed for the purposes of the Act. Given the broad definition of 'disclosable conduct' and of 'supervisor' in the Act, the application of the supervisor provisions has been problematic.

To understand the intent of the supervisor provisions it is important to consider the background of s 60A's inclusion in the legislation.

The capacity to make a disclosure to a person's supervisor and the responsibility for the supervisor to inform an authorised officer was not part of the initial PID Bill introduced in the Parliament. It was, however, included in the subsequent Government amendments that followed recommendations by the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislative Committee, which considered the Bill.

Many stakeholders expressed to the Committee their concern that the network of authorised officers (on its own) would be insufficient to ensure disclosers would be encouraged and supported to make an internal disclosure.

The Committee accepted that concern and also had regard to the evidence presented in some submissions that disclosures of wrongdoing (including those similar to the types of disclosures under the PID scheme) are usually made to a person's supervisor.

The Committee was concerned that the protections for the discloser, which was one of the major objectives of the scheme, would not be available in such cases under the original PID Bill.

We understand that the main reason for the supervisor provisions was to ensure greater accessibility for public officials to make a public interest disclosure and to ensure they would receive the protections provided under the Act.

However, we do not believe the Act was intended to be an overarching mandatory reporting and investigation framework. It was not intended to completely replace other well-established public sector integrity, accountability and investigative processes such as the functions of statutory oversight and investigative bodies, as well as internal agency functions including internal audit and fraud detection, human resources and legal services.

We are also concerned that strictly applying the Act supervisor provisions in some agencies, and to public officials in particular roles, could unintentionally broaden the scope and operation of the PID scheme and result in unnecessary reporting and duplication.

Take, for example, staff and investigation officers of Commonwealth oversight and integrity bodies who, in exercising their statutory functions and powers, will routinely report or discuss particular matters with their supervisor.

Such matters may also meet one or more of the grounds within the definition of disclosable conduct under the Act. However, by virtue of the relationship between the staff member and the supervisor, an ordinary discussion of routine matters that the organisation deals with every day could meet the test in s 60A of the Act.

Arguably, the supervisor is then obliged to report that information to an authorised officer, even if the issue is already being appropriately managed by other mechanisms.

Similarly, the supervisor provisions in the Act could unintentionally be triggered during the normal course of work of certain well-established areas within agencies. For example, a member of an agency's internal audit and fraud area, complaints management area, human resources or legal team, would routinely identify a suspected wrongdoing and then report or discuss the matter with their supervisor.

This would regularly occur during the course of their normal responsibilities, such as identifying and investigating breaches of finance or system controls by staff, addressing claims of maladministration by members of the public or providing legal advice in reviewing administrative decisions.

Under these common scenarios s 60A of the Act would require the supervisor to inform an authorised officer of the potential disclosable conduct, thereby requiring a range of additional responsibilities that were not intended. As there is no discretion under the Act for the supervisor not to report the disclosure to the authorised officer, it would result in unnecessary duplication and administration.

We have provided agencies with guidance about common sense approaches to these situations that should minimise the confusion for supervisors, without undermining the purposes of the Act.

There are further complications when the supervisor is also an authorised officer under the PID Act, which brings into play additional obligations.

We have emphasised to agencies the importance of carefully considering who to appoint as authorised officers, so as to avoid unintentionally expanding the number of routine matters that might be unnecessarily caught by the Act. Consistent with that advice, many agencies have chosen not to appoint the heads of internal audit, human resources or legal teams as authorised officers.

Disclosures made on behalf of another person

Under the Act, any current or former public official can make a PID to an authorised internal recipient. There is no requirement for the person making the disclosure to have been affected by or have witnessed the suspected wrongdoing.

The person needs only to satisfy the threshold test under the Act that 'the discloser believes on reasonable grounds that the information tends to show one or more instances of disclosable conduct' (s 26). The Act does not necessarily contemplate a disclosure being made on behalf of another person.

We have come across a number of scenarios where this 'second-hand reporting' has become an issue. For example, a former public official, who was also a blogger, encouraged current public officials to inform him of suspected wrongdoing in their agency.

He wanted to use that information to make disclosures on behalf of current public officials. It was also likely that he wanted to inform the public of such wrongdoing by referencing the disclosure on the blog.

As the former public official was the person reporting the wrongdoing, he would have been considered to be the discloser and would accordingly attract the protections under the Act. However, the people informing the blogger of suspected wrongdoing through the internet may not be protected as they do not meet the criteria for making a valid internal or external disclosure under the Act.

As such the current public official who identified the suspected wrongdoing may not get the full protections intended for their benefit under the Act. A similar situation would apply where the former public official is now a lawyer or a trade union representative seeking to represent current public officials.

In addition, where these types of disclosures are allocated for investigation, agencies may find it difficult to properly investigate the information on the basis that it does not come from an original source.

As a result the investigator may find it difficult to verify or rely on the information and would need to clarify or seek further information from the person who witnessed the wrongdoing.

Complaint trends

Disclosers can make a complaint to our office about an agency's handling or the outcome of a PID investigation, or to IGIS if the matter relates to one of the intelligence agencies. Investigations of such complaints are conducted under the Ombudsman Act 1976 or the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

Generally, before the Ombudsman or IGIS investigate the complaint, an agency would have completed its investigation, which agencies have 90 days to complete.

Since the commencement of the Act we have received seven complaints concerning an agency's investigation or handling of a PID⁶. While it is still early in the operational stage of the Act, the complaints made to our office tend to suggest that agencies could do better to communicate the PID process to officials and manage the expectations of the discloser.

The Act obliges agencies to communicate certain information to disclosers throughout the allocation and investigation processes. People have complained to us that since making their disclosure, they have not been kept informed of the progress of the investigation.

They have also told us they do not understand the investigation process and are unclear about whether the matter is still being investigated. Our feedback to agencies has centred on improving communication with the discloser so their expectations are properly managed.

Complaints to our office have been an invaluable source of information regarding systemic issues. In future we anticipate being able to identify and resolve systemic issues through the investigation of complaints about agencies' handling of PIDs.

Ombudsman and IGIS monitoring role

The majority of potential disclosers who have approached us to make a disclosure (rather than the agency to which the disclosure relates) generally state they have done so because of fear of reprisal action and mistrust of the agency concerned.

This provides our office the opportunity to explain to disclosers some important aspects of the Act including the benefits of making a disclosure directly to the agency concerned, the key role that agencies play in the operation of the Act, an agency's obligation to investigate and, most importantly, the protection against reprisal that the Act provides.

Number of disclosures received by the Ombudsman

This office received 28 approaches from people wishing to make a PID about another Commonwealth agency. In 16 of those we determined that the matter did not meet the threshold requirements of an internal PID.

Under the Act, an additional requirement for making a disclosure to us is that the discloser must demonstrate a belief on reasonable grounds that the matter should be investigated by the Ombudsman.

Where the discloser has not been able to provide reasonable grounds, we have determined that the disclosure has not been made to an authorised internal recipient and therefore the matter does not meet this threshold requirement of an internal PID.

In such cases the Ombudsman is not required to allocate the disclosure. However, it remains open to the public official to make their disclosure directly to the agency to which it relates.

Of the 16 approaches by potential disclosers, we determined that in 15 of these cases the discloser was not able to show reasonable grounds why the Ombudsman should investigate and therefore that disclosure had not been made to an authorised internal recipient.

In such cases we suggested that the person approach an authorised internal recipient (for example, their supervisor or an authorised officer) within the relevant agency. As such we determined that the Ombudsman was not an authorised internal recipient for these disclosures.

In the other case we determined that the person was not a public official and the information disclosed did not amount to disclosable conduct.

The Ombudsman assessed 12 disclosures to meet the threshold requirements for the matter to be an internal PID. Of these, six were allocated to the agency to which the information related and six were allocated to the Ombudsman for investigation.

The six matters that were allocated to the Ombudsman's office were either matters that would have raised a conflict of interest if allocated to the relevant agency, or the PID involved a number of agencies. Five of the six are ongoing and we exercised discretion under s 48 of the Act not to investigate one matter further.

Number of disclosures received by IGIS

IGIS received four approaches from potential disclosers, of which two were assessed not to meet the threshold requirements for the matter to be a disclosure. In both cases IGIS determined that the discloser had not provided sufficient information.

IGIS assessed one of the other two approaches to be a PID and allocated it to a relevant agency for investigation.

The fourth approach to IGIS was received in the last week of the reporting period and at that time lacked sufficient detail for the IGIS authorised officer to determine whether or not it should be handled as a PID. Further information was received early in the next reporting period which removed any doubt and the matter was formally allocated to IGIS for investigation shortly afterwards.

Notifications received by the Ombudsman and IGIS

The Act requires that agencies inform the Ombudsman or IGIS of:

• a decision to allocate a disclosure for investigation
• a decision not to investigate, or not investigate further
• a request for an extension of time to complete an investigation.

Table 2.4 sets out the number of notifications and requests for an extension received by the Ombudsman and IGIS.

Table 2.4: Number of PID notifications and requests for extension

The Act does not prescribe a time in which agencies must inform the Ombudsman or IGIS of their notification decisions or requests for an extension. However, we have asked that agencies provide this information within 10 working days of the decision being made.

We have asked agencies to request an extension of time 21 days before the expiration of the 90-day period that the Act allows them to complete their investigation if they are unlikely to be able to meet that legislated deadline.

A review of the number of disclosures recorded by agencies (378) against the number of notifications received (322) indicates that some agencies are delaying notification or are unaware of their requirement to notify us.

Similarly, agencies recorded that they had exercised discretion not to investigate a disclosure in 91 cases. However, the total number of notifications received by the Ombudsman was only 58.

We will follow up these discrepancies with agencies to ensure they adhere to their notification obligations in future.

Prescribed investigative agency

The Act envisaged that other investigative agencies could be prescribed by the PID Rules. However, at the moment no PID Rules exist. This has resulted in some specialist agencies (for example, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, the Australian Human Rights Commission, the Australian Public Service Commission and the Parliamentary Service Commissioner) not being given the power to investigate matters under the PID Act within their specialist jurisdictions.

It has also resulted in limiting the options for disclosers, as they cannot make an internal PID to these agencies.

Awareness raising and assistance

Activities of Implementation

Before the implementation of the PID Act we established a dedicated telephone line and email address for agencies and public officials to facilitate enquiries concerning the new scheme.

This year we received more than 250 PID-related approaches to those channels, of which about 70% were made from agency representatives and 30% from potential disclosers. Answering enquiries from agencies and disclosers has enabled us to provide assistance as well as gain an insight into the issues faced by agencies and disclosers.

We have published a number of resources to help agencies and public officials understand the scheme. Resources were made publicly available from October 2013 and since then we received more than 12,500 unique page views⁷ to our PID website.

The number of people visiting the website, along with feedback from agencies, indicates that the resources and the activities we have run have been well received.

Our PID resources include:

• better-practice guides for disclosers considering making a PID and for agencies in managing their responsibilities
• five fact sheets on key components of the scheme including the purpose of the legislation, how public officials make a PID, the responsibilities of principal officers, the role of authorised officers, and the roles of the Ombudsman and IGIS
• an iterative series of frequently asked questions
• three purpose-built forms to help agencies meet their obligation to notify us of an allocation of a disclosure for investigation; a decision not to investigate (or not to investigate further); and to request extensions of time
• copies of presentations made at various forums to support and promote awareness
• a series of PID scheme logo graphics for agencies to download and use on their websites as easily recognisable icons
• links to the PID Act, and to the PID Standard created by this office, available on ComLaw
• details of information sessions conducted by our office for agencies and public officials on key aspects of the Act.

These resources can be viewed at www.pid.ombudsman.gov.au.

We are in the process of reviewing our resources and developing further fact sheets, frequently asked questions and posters for agencies to use.

Presentations, forums and meetings

In the reporting period we delivered a significant number of presentations to agencies about the operation and application of the Act. We conducted 69 presentations, which included 42 to individual agencies and 10 information sessions delivered to multiple agencies in Canberra, Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane and Darwin.

In addition we have used opportunities to speak at forums to promote and educate public officials about the operation and application of the Act including:

• ACT Small Agencies Forum, 10 October 2013
• ACT Institute of Public Administration (IPAA) seminar—PIDs: Strengthening integrity, 22 October 2013
• LegalWise—Accountability and transparency seminar, 7 November 2013
• Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) forum: People Management Network and Australian Government Leadership Network, Brisbane, 14 November 2013
• APS Ethics Contact Officer Network, 18 November 2013
• Australian Government Solicitor Government Law Group seminar, 18 November 2013
• Whistleblowers Australia national conference, Sydney, 23 November 2013
• APSC forum: People Management Network and Australian Government Leadership Network, Melbourne, 3 December 2013
• APSC forum: People Management Network, Sydney, 5 December 2013

• Commonwealth Authorities and Companies (CAC) Act finance and legal forum, Canberra, 12 December 2013
• APS Indigenous employment HR forum, 6 March 2014
• PID oversight forum, Canberra, 20 March 2014
• PID research forum, Canberra, 21 March 2014
• Human Capital Matters research forum, Canberra, 12 May 2014
• PID research forum, Sydney, 21 May 2014.

We coordinated and led a PID forum comprising PID oversight agencies including state Ombudsmen and state or territory Public Service Commissions, and academics. The purpose of the forum was to share information, learnings and best practice, and consider opportunities for collaboration. The forum intends to meet annually.

We are also a regular participant in a community of practice made up of seven agencies with the aim of sharing best practices and implementation issues. We intend setting up other community of practice groups with a cross-section of Commonwealth agencies in various locations around Australia.

We have delivered five PID awareness-raising sessions to our staff around Australia. As well, at their request, we have met with agencies separately to help them to navigate through their PID implementation and application issues.

Table 2.5: Number and types of PIDs received, and number investigated

Agencies that recorded receiving no PIDs

1. AAF Company
2. Aboriginal Hostels Limited
3. Albury Wodonga Development Corporation
4. Anindilyakwa Land Council
5. Army and Air Force Canteen Service
6. Asbestos Safety and Eradication Agency
7. Attorney-General's Department
8. Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
9. Australia Council
10. Australian Accounting Standards Board
11. Australian Aged Care Quality Agency
12. Australian Broadcasting Corporation
13. Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research
14. Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
15. Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare
16. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
17. Australian Electoral Commission
18. Australian Film, Television and Radio School
19. Australian Financial Security Authority
20. Australian Hearing Services
21. Australian Human Rights Commission
22. Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership Ltd
23. Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
24. Australian Institute of Criminology
25. Australian Institute of Family Studies
26. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
27. Australian Institute of Marine Science
28. Australian Law Reform Commission
29. Australian Maritime Safety Authority
30. Australian Military Forces Relief Trust Fund
31. Australian National Audit Office
32. Australian National Maritime Museum
33. Australian National Preventive Health Authority
34. Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority
35. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
36. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
37. Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation
38. Australian Renewable Energy Agency
39. Australian Research Council
40. Australian River Company Ltd
41. Australian Securities and Investments Commission
42. Australian Skills Quality Authority
43. Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority
44. Australian Sports Commission
45. Australian Sports Foundation Ltd
46. Australian Strategic Policy Institute
47. Australian Trade Commission (Austrade)
48. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
49. Australian Transport Safety Bureau
50. Bundanon Trust
51. Cancer Australia
52. Clean Energy Finance Corporation
53. Clean Energy Regulator
54. Climate Change Authority
55. Coal Mining Industry (Long Service Leave Funding) Corporation
56. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
57. Commonwealth Grants Commission
58. Commonwealth Ombudsman
59. Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation
60. Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee
61. Cotton Research & Development Corporation
62. Creative Partnerships Australia
63. CrimTrac Agency
64. Defence Housing Australia
65. Defence Intelligence Organisation
66. Department of Communications
67. Department of Industry (includes Geoscience Australia and Australian Astronomical Observatory)
68. Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
69. Department of the House of Representatives
70. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
71. Department of the Senate
72. Department of Veterans' Affairs
73. Director of National Parks
74. Export Finance and Insurance Corporation
75. Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (Fair Work Building & Construction)
76. Fair Work Commission
77. Fair Work Ombudsman
78. Federal Court of Australia
79. Fisheries Research and Development Corporation
80. Food Standards Australia New Zealand
81. Future Fund Management Agency
82. General Practice Education and Training Limited
83. Grains Research and Development Corporation
84. Grape and Wine Research and Development Corporation
85. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority
86. Health Workforce Australia
87. High Court of Australia
88. IIF Investments Pty Ltd
89. Independent Hospital Pricing Authority
90. Indigenous Business Australia
91. Indigenous Land Corporation
92. Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
93. Medibank Private Limited
94. Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal
95. Moorebank Intermodal Company Limited
96. Murray-Darling Basin Authority
97. Museum of Australian Democracy at Old Parliament House
98. National Australia Day Council
99. National Capital Authority
100. National Competition Commission
101. National Disability Insurance Agency
102. National Film and Sound Archive of Australia
103. National Gallery of Australia
104. National Health Funding Body
105. National Health Performance Authority
106. National Library of Australia
107. National Mental Health Commission
108. National Portrait Gallery of Australia
109. National Transport Commission
110. National Water Commission
111. Northern Land Council
112. Office of National Assessments
113. Office of Parliamentary Counsel
114. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner
115. Office of the Inspector-General of Taxation
116. Office of the Official Secretary to the Governor-General
117. Organ and Tissue Authority
118. Outback Stores Pty Ltd
119. Parliamentary Budget Office
120. Private Health Insurance Administration Council
121. Private Health Insurance Ombudsman
122. Productivity Commission
123. Professional Services Review Agency
124. Reserve Bank of Australia
125. Royal Australian Air Force Veterans' Residences Trust Fund
126. Royal Australian Air Force Welfare Recreational Company
127. Royal Australian Air Force Welfare Trust Fund
128. Royal Australian Navy Central Canteens Board (trading as Navy Canteens)
129. Royal Australian Navy Relief Trust Fund
130. Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation
131. Safe Work Australia
132. Screen Australia
133. Special Broadcasting Services Corporation
134. Sydney Harbour Federation Trust
135. Telecommunications Universal Service Management Agency
136. Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency
137. Tiwi Land Council
138. Tourism Australia
139. Wine Australia Corporation
140. Workplace Gender Equality Agency
141. Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council

Table 2.6: Actions that the principal officer took in response to recommendations in reports relating to PID investigations, by agency

[Back to Top]

International

Our office receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to support Ombudsmen and allied integrity institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. We provide assistance through individual activities, for example the provision of investigative training, and by supporting complaint-handling and integrity networks. In 2013–14 we had four programmes.

Indonesia

Our programme with the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI) aims to help ORI become a strong member of the international Ombudsman community and a key part of the Indonesian integrity framework. Under this programme we hosted three visitors from ORI to study compensation mechanisms within a number of industry Ombudsman schemes and Australian court jurisdictions. This activity helped ORI in its new Special Adjudication function, which involves assessing and awarding compensation for government maladministration.

We also prepared and delivered two advanced investigation training courses and two basic investigation courses in Indonesia. Most of the newly employed investigators in Jakarta and ORI's regional offices have now participated in investigations training.

Papua New Guinea

We have had a twinning programme with the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea (OCPNG) since 2006. This provides support at a number of levels within the organisation to strengthen the OCPNG's capacity to carry out its constitutional function.

Activities under this programme in 2013–14 included:

• a training programme for OCPNG investigators on investigative methods
• three officers from the OCPNG being hosted by investigation teams in our office for two-month placements
• a training programme on financial analysis for the OCPNG's Leadership Annual Statements team
• one officer from the OCPNG undertaking a two-month placement with the Victorian Ombudsman's office
• training on interviewing skills for OCPNG investigators.

Pacific Ombudsman Alliance

The Pacific Ombudsman Alliance (POA) is a service-delivery and mutual-support organisation for Ombudsmen and allied institutions of countries that are members of the Pacific Islands Forum. Our office receives funding from DFAT to provide secretariat services and fund activities, which are selected and evaluated by the POA Board.

In 2013–14 POA worked in partnership with a number of other organisations to provide support to members. On International Human Rights Day, 10 December 2013, the Samoan Ombudsman's Office launched its new Human Rights function and its commencement as a national human rights institution. POA worked with the Asia Pacific Forum, the United Nations Development Programme and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to support the Samoan Ombudsman's Office to implement these new responsibilities.

In Kiribati POA worked with the Australian Public Service Commission to help develop a more integrated complaint process to improve public sector services. We also supported the Auditor-General of the Marshall Islands with a major fraud investigation.

A successful POA members' meeting was held in Adelaide in April 2014. We welcomed a number of first-time attendees to the meeting, including the Auditor-General from the Federated States of Micronesia and the Ombudsman of Palau.

Solomon Islands

Our office has had an institutional partnership with the Office of the Ombudsman Solomon Islands (OOSI) since 2010. In 2013–14 the focus of our support was to work with OOSI to improve their IT and communication systems and infrastructure. We are also the Australian Partner Organisation for two Australian volunteers for development, who are working with OOSI on complaint processes and major investigations.

International Ombudsman Institute

The Commonwealth Ombudsman is a member of the International Ombudsman Institute (IOI), a global organisation that promotes cooperation between more than 150 Ombudsman institutions.

The Ombudsman is a member of the Australasia-Pacific Ombudsman Region (APOR) and attended the regional meeting hosted by the South Australian Ombudsman in Adelaide in April 2014. At that meeting, the Ombudsman was elected to the Board of Directors of APOR as the Regional President.

Footnotes

1 This figure includes the Ombudsman and IGIS.

2 This figure includes internal disclosures made about the Ombudsman and IGIS, but does not include internal disclosures received by the Ombudsman and IGIS about another agency.

3 Appendix 1 shows the number of PIDs received by agencies in the reporting period.

4 See Table 2.5 for the total numbers of PIDs that agencies reported to have received in the reporting period.

5 We note that these figures may also reflect some PIDs that the Act did not intend to capture as a PID; however, we have recorded the figures based purely on information provided to us by agencies. The issue concerning the Act not intending to capture all matters is discussed under the heading, 'Unintended consequences of the PID Act'.

6 IGIS has received no complaints.

7 Unique page views are the number of visits during which the specified page was viewed at least once. Where a person views the same webpage from the same computer more than once, this will only be counted as one unique page view.

8 Includes reporting for the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission.

9 Includes reporting for the Australian Office of Financial Management and the Royal Australian Mint.

10 Includes reporting for the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission.